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ABSTRACT 
 
PRIVATE COMMUNICATION AMONG COMPETITORS AND PUBLIC 
DISCLOSURE 
John Kepler 
Christopher Armstrong 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that firms benefit from coordinating pricing and production 
decisions. One way firms can coordinate such decisions is through private communication. 
However, private communication between competing firms is typically not allowed by 
anti-trust regulations. In the absence of private communication, theories at the intersection 
of accounting and industrial organization suggest that competing firms can use public 
disclosure to coordinate. These theories predict a substitutive relation between private 
communication and public disclosure that serves a coordinating role: private 
communication reduces the need to coordinate via public disclosure. I exploit data on the 
extent of private communication among competing firms in strategic alliances to examine 
how private communication manifests in firms’ public disclosure decisions. Consistent 
with theoretical predictions, I find that firms that enter into strategic alliances with 
competitors reduce their public disclosure about expected future business conditions, 
including forecasts of demand and production levels, and that the reduction is most 
pronounced for firms in alliances that entail more extensive private communication. 
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Private Communication among Competitors and Public Disclosure 
 
Introduction  
A long line of literature examines the monitoring and valuation roles of firms’ 
public disclosures—i.e., the roles of disclosure in mitigating agency conflicts and 
facilitating valuation by capital providers (see Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010; Leuz 
and Wysocki, 2016 for reviews). In contrast, the coordination role of firms’ public 
disclosures––i.e., the role of disclosure in facilitating coordination of pricing and 
production decisions among competitors—has received considerably less attention. In this 
paper, I examine whether and the extent to which private communication among 
competitors substitutes for the coordination role of public disclosure.  
A large body of theory at the intersection of accounting and industrial organization 
suggests that competitors use public disclosures to coordinate their production and pricing 
decisions. For example, Fried (1984, p. 375) argues that competing firms are mutually 
better off by publicly disclosing information about their expected business conditions “not 
only because firms are better off when they learn about their competition but also because 
they can be better off when their competition learns about them.” In particular, by learning 
about competitors’ production decisions, firms can adjust their own production to avoid 
over- or under-production and increase their collective profits. For instance, firms might 
publicly disclose that product demand is weaker than expected to encourage competitors 
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to restrain their own production (see also Vives, 1984; Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; 
Bertomeu and Liang, 2015; Arya and Mittendorf, 2016).1  
Importantly, these theories about the coordination role of public disclosure are 
predicated on the notion that competing firms cannot credibly exchange information 
privately. For example, private communication of quantity and price information among 
competitors is likely to invite considerable scrutiny from regulators, such as the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  If firms 
can credibly exchange information privately, public disclosure loses its value as a 
coordination mechanism (e.g., Gigler, 1994; Reis and Stocken, 2007). Consequently, 
private communication between competitors reduces—and, in the limit, eliminates—the 
usefulness of public disclosure as a coordination mechanism. 
Reflecting concerns that firms’ public disclosures can be used to facilitate 
coordination, the DOJ and FTC have explicitly stated an interest in investigating whether 
competitors use public disclosures to coordinate production and pricing decisions (e.g., 
OECD, 2010). For example, in a recent case, the FTC accused Stone Container Corporation 
of using a management forecast to publicly disclose information about its future production 
plans, thereby allowing its competitors to coordinate their production quantities and 
ultimately increase prices for consumers (OECD, 2010, p. 304). The FTC concluded that 
this disclosure contained no information other than an implicit proposal to its competitors 
that, if accepted, would foster illegal coordination. In another case, the FTC alleged that 
                                                            
1 In the context of these models, one can think of the “coordination benefits” of disclosure as the opposite of 
the more familiar “proprietary costs” of disclosure, which are often characterized as a negative side effect of 
firms’ public disclosures. Analogously, the coordination role of disclosure entails a direct, competitive 
benefit of firms’ disclosures.  
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U-Haul used its earnings call to provide information about its future pricing strategy, 
knowing that its key competitors would be monitoring the call (OECD, 2010). Although 
economic theory predicts and anecdotal evidence suggests a coordination role for public 
disclosure systematic empirical evidence about the coordination role of public disclosure 
is limited.2  
In this paper, I use data on the existence and structure of approximately 115,000 
strategic alliances between 1994 and 2016 to examine how private communication among 
competitors influences their public disclosure decisions. Strategic alliances—in which 
firms pool their complementary resources and exercise joint control over certain business 
activities—provide a direct channel for credible private communication (e.g., Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Ménard, 2004; Schoenfeld, 2018). For example, Schoenfeld (2018) shows 
that joint venture agreements—one of the most common forms of strategic alliances—
contractually require firms to share a variety of private information among participants.3 
To the extent that alliance partners are also engaged in activities in which they currently or 
may potentially compete, these direct private communication channels can also be used—
in lieu of public disclosure—for coordination purposes. Importantly, private 
communication in the context of strategic alliances is generally less likely to run afoul of 
                                                            
2 While antitrust regulators tend to focus their enforcement efforts on reducing illicit coordination among 
competitors (e.g., price-fixing cartels), coordination among firms represents a continuum and can take many 
forms, including facilitating coordination of investment activities that are more innocuous from the 
perspective of consumers, but still improve the allocation of resources among firms. 
3 Strategic alliances have surged in recent years: recent estimates indicate that the thousand largest public 
U.S. firms earn 40% of their revenue through strategic alliances and that 60% of U.S. CEOs have current or 
future plans to enter into strategic alliances with competitors (ASAP, 2002, p. 8; PwC, 2016). Furthermore, 
Bamford (2017) reports that global corporate investment in joint ventures currently exceeds $5 trillion per 
year, recently surpassing the global M&A market in terms of deal value (J.P. Morgan, 2017).  
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antitrust regulations, “as the private disclosure of price information may be commercially 
justifiable between […] joint venture participants” (OECD, 2010, p. 108).4  
Several studies in the industrial organization literature highlight the importance of 
private communication among partners as a byproduct of strategic alliances. For instance, 
Ménard (2004) characterizes strategic alliances as “cooperative games” among 
competitors, with partner-specific communication that both facilitates coordination of 
alliance-related activities and creates “knowledge spillovers” due to the information that 
firms obtain about their partners’ non-alliance activities (see also, Williamson, 1985, 
1991). In addition, prior research finds that strategic alliances that require more extensive 
private communication—e.g., regularly scheduled meetings, co-location of employees, the 
right to examine and audit all relevant records, etc.—tend to last longer and are less prone 
to opportunistic behavior by partners (e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Thomas and Trevino, 1993; 
Reuer and Koza, 2000). Thus, an important byproduct of strategic alliances is that they 
establish a private communication channel among firms that endow firms with information 
about participating firms.  
A newfound ability to privately communicate through a strategic alliance should 
reduce the coordination benefits of public disclosure. Consequently, to the extent that firms 
use public disclosure to coordinate their production and pricing decisions, I expect a 
reduction in firms’ public disclosures after forming strategic alliances. Consistent with this 
                                                            
4 Antitrust regulators also explicitly acknowledge that strategic alliances and joint ventures between firms 
can act as a private information exchange mechanism for firms to coordinate with each other with potentially 
adverse effects on consumers. For example, in 2017 the DOJ raided a private meeting among CEOs of several 
large shipping companies that were involved in multiple alliances as part of an investigation into the potential 
anticompetitive effects of the firms’ new strategic alliances with each other (Saul and Wallis, 2017). 
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prediction, using multiple measures of public disclosure, I find that firms that enter 
strategic alliances subsequently reduce their public disclosures of expected future business 
conditions and specifically reduce disclosure about forecasted demand and production 
levels.  
To sharpen empirical identification and provide more direct evidence that the 
reduction in public disclosure is due to a reduction in the coordination benefits of 
disclosure, I conduct three sets of cross-sectional tests. In the first set of tests, I examine 
whether the reduction in disclosure varies predictably with several proxies for the amount 
of private communication among alliance partners: (i) whether the alliance is formed 
among direct competitors, which are more likely to involve the exchange of information 
that is beneficial for coordination (Teece, 1992; PwC, 2016); (ii) the number of partners, 
which provide alliance partners with a broader range of information about more firms; (iii) 
whether the alliance is an equity-based joint venture, which entails stronger contractual ties 
and the exchange of more detailed financial information (e.g., Kogut, 1988; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Anderson, Christ, Dekker, and Sedatole, 2014); and (iv) whether the alliance 
involves research and development (R&D) or manufacturing activities, which require more 
frequent and detailed private communication relative to other types of alliances (e.g., 
Anand and Khanna, 2000; Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Using each of these measures of 
the degree of private communication, I find evidence of a greater reduction in public 
disclosure when there is more extensive private communication among alliance partners.  
In the second set of tests, I examine settings where private communication is 
limited. In particular, I examine (i) licensing alliances, which involve the exchange of 
proprietary technology but are less likely to involve frequent information exchange (e.g., 
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Anand and Khanna, 2000), and (ii) alliance terminations, which sever firms’ private 
communication channels with their partners. I expect the negative association between 
strategic alliances and voluntary disclosure to be weaker for firms entering into licensing 
alliances, and I expect firms that terminate their alliance relationships to subsequently 
increase their voluntary disclosures. I find that the reduction in public disclosure is 
unchanged for firms entering licensing alliances and that firms that terminate their alliance 
relationships subsequently increase their voluntary disclosures.  
In the third set of tests, I examine settings with lower a priori coordination benefits 
and expect a weaker relation between private communication and firms’ public disclosure. 
Theory suggests that the coordination benefits of public disclosure are smallest in highly 
competitive industries, as firms in more competitive industries benefit more from 
withholding information from their competitors (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; Bertomeu 
and Liang, 2015).5 Based on this intuition, I predict and find evidence that the relation 
between private communication and firms’ public disclosure is weaker among strategic 
alliances in more competitive industries.  
Finally, to help mitigate concerns about omitted variables that may jointly affect 
both firms’ decision to form an alliance and their public disclosure, I use a quasi-natural 
experiment to examine the effect of a plausibly exogenous shock to firms’ incentives to 
form strategic alliances on their public disclosures. This analysis is based on the staggered 
adoption of combined reporting rules across different states at different times. Combined 
                                                            
5 For instance, in the context of Clinch and Verrecchia (1997), if a firm in a more competitive industry 
discloses information that reveals stronger than expected demand, it is more likely to induce its competitors 
to cut prices in the current period. 
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reporting rules increase the benefits of implementing investments through strategic 
alliances by reducing firms’ ability to use subsidiaries to shift income across states for tax 
benefits (e.g., Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013; Li, Qiu, and Wang, 2018). Consistent 
with prior corporate finance studies, I find that firms that become subject to combined 
reporting are more likely to form strategic alliances, and in turn, reduce their public 
disclosures about expected future business conditions, as well as forecasted demand and 
production levels. 
My evidence from multiple sets of complementary tests consistently suggests that 
firms that privately communicate with each other through strategic alliances reduce their 
public disclosures that facilitate coordination. Although this evidence is largely indirect 
that the reduction in public disclosure after establishing a private communication channel 
is consistent with a reduction in the coordination benefits of public disclosure, other forces 
could also be responsible for such a reduction in disclosure in my setting. In particular, 
standard models of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1986; 
Verrecchia, 1990) suggest four general economic forces that lead to a reduction in 
voluntary disclosure: (i) an increase in bad news, (ii) an increase in proprietary costs, (iii) 
a decrease in managers’ private information, and (iv) a decrease in investors’ uncertainty 
about the firm. To explain my collective results, these forces would need to systematically 
vary with (i) firms’ strategic alliance activity, (ii) the attributes of their strategic alliances, 
(iii) product market competition, and (iv) the staggered adoption of combined reporting 
rules.  
I conduct a number of additional analyses designed to mitigate concerns about these 
forces in my setting. First, I find that strategic alliance announcements are, on average, 
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interpreted by equity investors as good news, as evidenced by the positive market reaction 
to their announcement. Second, with regard to an increase in proprietary costs, I find that 
firms that enter strategic alliances subsequently reduce their disclosures that are likely to 
be proprietary and non-proprietary in nature alike. Moreover, my findings are concentrated 
in industries that are typically considered to have relatively low proprietary costs (e.g., 
industries with fewer competitors). Third, with regard to a decrease in managers’ private 
information, I find no evidence of a relation between alliance activity and management 
forecast accuracy, but I do find a strong positive relation between alliance activity and 
managers’ insider trading activity, which, if anything, is consistent with an increase in their 
private information. Finally, with regard to a decrease in investors’ uncertainty, I find a 
strong positive relation between alliance activity and participants’ bid-ask spreads, which 
is consistent with higher, rather than lower, investor uncertainty. Collectively, these 
findings are inconsistent with strategic alliances resulting in more bad news, higher 
proprietary costs, or a reduction in managers’ private information or investors’ uncertainty. 
While much of the prior disclosure literature focuses on the monitoring and 
valuation roles of public disclosure, my results highlight and shed new light on another 
important role for public disclosure: namely facilitating coordination among competitors. 
Only a handful of empirical studies—all of which are recent—examine the role of public 
disclosure as a coordination mechanism. For example, Bertomeu, Evans, Feng, and Tseng 
(2015) examine how automobile manufacturers exchange production information through 
trade associations when engaged in tacit collusion to fix prices. Bloomfield (2018) 
examines whether competitors use their public compensation disclosures to credibly signal 
their product market strategies (i.e., aggressive versus accommodating). Finally, Bourveau, 
9 
 
She, and Žaldokas (2018) examine whether U.S. firms publicly disclose more detailed 
information about their customers and products following the enactment of foreign anti-
trust laws. My study contributes to this emerging stream of literature by using strategic 
alliances as a powerful research setting that entails a large, heterogeneous set of firms that 
unambiguously establish a legal private communication channels with their competitors to 
examine how this private communication channel affects their public disclosures.   
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical and institutional 
motivation for my empirical predictions. Section 3 describes my sample and measurement 
choices. Section 4 describes my research design, presents results, and provides a discussion 
of potential alternative explanations. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
Background and Empirical Predictions  
2.1. Background on strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances are a mode of organizing economic activity whereby two or 
more partners pool certain property- and strategic-decision rights while simultaneously 
maintaining their distinct ownership and control over other assets, thereby necessitating 
alliance-specific mechanisms to coordinate their joint activities (Gibbons and Roberts, 
2013, p. 1066). Several influential studies define a strategic alliance—often referred to as 
a “hybrid” organization in the economics literature (Ménard, 2004)—as any voluntary 
cooperative arrangement among firms that involves the exchange or co-development of 
products, technologies, or services (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Teece, 1992). For example, in 
joint ventures—which are one of the most common forms of strategic alliances—firms 
mutually commit resources and form a separate, jointly owned and controlled legal entity 
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to pursue a project, with the profits of the venture typically accruing proportionally to the 
partners according to their equity stake in the enterprise. 
These joint investments characterize business relationships that lie outside of the 
traditional boundaries of the firm and can be either vertical or horizontal (i.e., between 
firms and their suppliers or competitors, respectively). Moreover, strategic alliances take a 
variety of forms including joint ventures, production alliances, franchises, R&D expense 
sharing agreements, group purchasing organizations, and more (Ménard, 2004). The three 
key features of strategic alliances that distinguish them from other forms of economic 
organization (e.g., internally integrated firms) are (i) the pooling and joint control of 
resources across firm boundaries, (ii) contracting with partners, and, crucial for my study, 
(iii) simultaneous competition among the alliance participants’ separate business activities 
(Teece, 1992; Ménard, 2004, p. 351).  
The first distinguishing feature of strategic alliances—i.e., the pooling of 
resources—allows firms to coordinate and cooperate on joint investment decisions 
pertaining to assets that are worth more if jointly utilized. Delegating tasks across firm 
boundaries gives rise to a variety of coordination costs for firms involved in strategic 
alliances, such as developing and maintaining governance structures that minimize 
opportunistic behavior by strategic alliance partners, as well as ensuring robust inter-firm 
communication that facilitates collective decision-making.  
The second distinguishing feature of strategic alliances—i.e., contracting with 
partners—is that the members use a variety of formal and informal contracting mechanisms 
to govern the relationship. For instance, joint ventures require the collaborating firms to 
form a separate, jointly owned and controlled legal entity. Other forms of strategic 
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alliances, such as R&D expense sharing agreements, often rely less on “complete” (i.e., 
detailed and exhaustive) contracts and more on relational contracts that are “self-enforced” 
(or disciplined) by the potential for future profitable business interactions with partners that 
may be forfeited if one party misbehaves. Economic theory suggests that less formal 
relational contracts are particularly important for sustaining strategic alliances since they 
provide a relatively simple yet highly effective way to align alliance partners’ interests 
(Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2008).  
The third feature of strategic alliances that distinguishes them from other forms of 
economic organization—i.e., simultaneous competition among the alliance participants’ 
separate business activities—arises because alliance participants often simultaneously 
compete in product and labor markets, which introduces countervailing incentives for 
participants to behave opportunistically at the expense of their partners (Arslan, 2017). 
Moreover, even alliances among firms that are not necessarily direct competitors—e.g., 
strategic alliances between firms and their suppliers—can still involve competition. For 
example, several management studies show that suppliers in many of these “vertical” 
alliances are more likely to enter their business partners’ markets after forming strategic 
alliances due to “information spillovers” from the information exchanged during alliance 
relationships  (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Simonin, 
1999; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006).  
Information exchanged through private communication represents an important 
byproduct of strategic alliances. Theory suggests that efficient information exchange is 
crucial for the formation and success of strategic alliances. For instance, Williamson (1975, 
p. 31) argues that information asymmetry among partners coupled with their propensity to 
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behave opportunistically poses the most severe problem to strategic alliance partners. This 
threat gives rise to the need for business partners to transparently share information with 
each other about their alliance and non-alliance activities. Consistent with these arguments, 
several management studies find that strategic alliances with more effective information 
exchange policies—e.g., regularly scheduled meetings among senior managers of 
participating firms, co-location of employees, the right to examine and audit all relevant 
records and transactions—tend to last longer and are less prone to opportunistic behavior 
by business partners (e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Thomas and Trevino, 1993; Reuer and Koza, 
2000). For example, Parkhe (1993) finds that the most common contractual safeguards in 
strategic alliance contracts include provisions for timely and accurate communication of 
information, such as (i) periodic written reports of all relevant transactions, (ii) prompt 
written notice of any departures from the agreement, and (iii) the right to examine and audit 
all relevant records through a firm of Certified Public Accountants.6 Thus, an important 
byproduct of strategic alliances is that they establish a credible private communication 
channel among firms. 
Private communication among competitors regarding certain information—e.g., 
prices, quantities, inventory capacity, etc.—is likely to draw scrutiny from competition 
regulators. However, private communications among firms in the context of strategic 
alliances and joint ventures is generally less likely to conflict with antitrust regulations, “as 
                                                            
6 Furthermore, several managerial accounting studies provide additional evidence that management control 
systems in strategic alliances are explicitly designed to facilitate the transparent sharing of information 
between participating firms—e.g., internal reports of financial and non-financial information about 
participating firms’ alliance and non-alliance activities (see, e.g., Anderson and Dekker, 2014; Anderson, 
Christ, Dekker, and Sedatole, 2014, 2015). 
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the private disclosure of price information may be commercially justifiable between […] 
joint venture participants” (OECD, 2010, p. 108). Highlighting the degree of private 
communication among firms that strategic alliances facilitate, anecdotal evidence from my 
extensive conversations with strategic alliance consultants and lawyers indicates that senior 
management (e.g., CEOs) of strategic alliance partners do, in fact, tend to meet frequently, 
even if the strategic alliance’s operations account for only a small portion of the firm’s total 
operations (e.g., Saul and Wallis, 2017). While anecdotal, this evidence provides further 
corroboration for the notion that strategic alliances facilitate information exchange among 
participating firms beyond the scope of the strategic alliance activity.  
2.2. Empirical predictions: strategic alliance formation and public disclosure 
I argue that strategic alliances provide a private channel for credible private 
information exchange between competitors that reduces the coordination benefits of public 
disclosure. Theory predicts that it is often in firms’ best interest to disclose information 
about expected future business conditions in order to coordinate their production and 
pricing decisions (e.g., Fried, 1984; Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; Bertomeu and Liang, 
2015; Arya and Mittendorf, 2016). For example, Fried (1984, p. 376) finds that, by learning 
about competitors’ production decisions through public disclosures, firms can adjust their 
own production to increase their collective profits (e.g., by avoiding over- or under-
production), and that firms are “better off disclosing even if the competition does not 
reciprocate.”  
Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) also study the relation between voluntary disclosure 
and the degree of coordination between competitors. They find that it can be advantageous 
for firms to publicly disclose their private information about expected demand in order to 
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coordinate production decisions with their rivals. For instance, a firm might publicly 
disclose that product demand is weaker than expected to encourage its competitors to 
restrain their own output. Bertomeu and Liang (2015) find a similar result for firms 
coordinating their pricing strategies and show that public disclosure can be used 
strategically to sustain oligopolistic rents. In particular, by publicly disclosing information 
to its competitor, a firm can credibly signal its strategy, and its competitor can better 
respond in its own pricing and quantity decisions. The disclosing firm anticipates its 
competitor’s response and takes this into account when deciding whether to disclose in the 
first place––thus there are product market benefits from disclosure. In the context of these 
models, the coordination benefits of disclosure can be viewed as the opposite of the 
“proprietary costs” of disclosure: disclosure conveys direct, competitive benefits. 
Importantly, the coordination role of public disclosure is predicated on the notion 
that competing firms cannot credibly exchange information privately. For example, Gigler 
(1994, p. 229) and Reis and Stocken (2007, pp. 562–3) explain how competing firms’ 
inability to communicate privately is what makes public disclosures a potentially valuable 
coordination mechanism. However, if firms can credibly exchange information privately, 
then public disclosure becomes redundant and loses its value as a coordination mechanism. 
Therefore, allowing for private communication between competitors reduces—and, in the 
limit, eliminates—the usefulness of public disclosure as a coordination mechanism. To the 
extent that coordination shapes firms’ public disclosures, developing alternative channels 
to exchange information privately with competitors through strategic alliances should 
reduce the coordination benefits of public disclosure. Therefore, I predict that strategic 
alliance participation is associated with a decrease in voluntary disclosure.  
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If, on the other hand, the coordination role of disclosure is not a first-order concern 
for firms’ disclosure decisions, I would not expect to observe substitution between private 
communication among competitors and public disclosure. In the absence of coordination, 
the valuation role for public disclosure suggests that an increase in managers’ private 
information leads to increased disclosure (see, e.g., Bushee, Keusch, and Kim, 2019). The 
intuition is that more private information enables the manager to provide more accurate 
forecasts, which are rewarded by the capital market. Thus, in the absence of a coordinating 
role of disclosure, I expect strategic alliances to increase managers’ private information 
and, in turn, increase disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia, 1990). 
 
Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Sample construction and strategic alliance characteristics 
I obtain data on strategic alliance activity from 1994 through 2014 from Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum’s Alliances and Joint Ventures database, which tracks 
information on 116,776 unique strategic alliances entered into over this period.7 I obtain 
information on strategic alliances for (i) the start dates of the strategic alliance, (ii) the 
participants involved in each alliance, (iii) deal characteristics (e.g., whether the strategic 
alliance involves an equity-based joint venture that forms a separate legal entity), and (iv) 
                                                            
7 Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum Alliances and Joint Ventures database collects information about strategic 
alliances between firms from regulatory filings, press releases, and any other publicly available source. 
Thomson Reuters also maintains relationships with investment banks and law firms that are involved in these 
corporate deals and submit information to Thomson Reuters. Since public firms are required to disclose these 
material definitive agreements to shareholders (e.g., via an 8-K), SDC’s coverage of strategic alliances 
includes all of these business arrangements that public firms enter into. Furthermore, Thomson Reuters only 
collects information on “income-generating” strategic alliances and joint ventures, thereby excluding other 
types of business collaborations between firms that are not entered into with the purpose of either generating 
revenues or reducing costs.  
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the primary scope of the strategic alliance’s business activity (e.g., whether the alliance 
agreement primarily involves manufacturing or R&D activities).8 I merge the SDC data 
with the universe of firms covered by Compustat and CRSP, resulting in a final sample of 
115,912 unique firm-year observations, with 17,056 unique firm-years in which a firm 
enters at least one strategic alliance.  
Consistent with prior management and corporate finance literature on strategic 
alliances, I measure firms’ strategic alliance activity using the natural logarithm of the 
number of new strategic alliances entered into each year, StrategicAlliance (e.g., Seru, 
2014; Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013; Fich, Starks, and Yore, 2014). In particular, 
I examine new alliances entered into during each year because private communication 
between strategic alliance partners tends to be greatest at the beginning of the relationship 
(e.g., from due diligence activities, etc.), and I take the natural logarithm of the number of 
new strategic alliances entered into each year due to the skewed nature of the data. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Figure 1 plots strategic alliance activity over time. Panel A shows that the number 
of new strategic alliances announced each year ranges from a low of 1,530 during the peak 
of the global financial crisis in 2010 to a high of 10,539 in 2000. Panel B shows that equity-
based joint ventures comprise a substantial component of overall strategic alliances. Panel 
B also shows that much of the increase in strategic alliance activity around 2000 was due 
                                                            
8 Since SDC Platinum’s Alliances and Joint Ventures data is not machine-readable at the individual firm 
level, I develop a Python script to extract individual firm-level details from each alliance in the database and 
match them to the universe of firms covered by Compustat and CRSP on CUSIP.  
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to non-equity strategic alliances that do not involve a formal joint venture agreement 
between firms.  
Figure 1. New Strategic Alliances Announcements per Year 
This figure plots the number of new strategic alliances announced per year. Panel A presents the total number 
of new strategic alliances announced each year. Panel B presents the total number of new joint ventures and 
non-joint venture strategic alliances (i.e., “Contractual Strategic Alliances”) announcements separately. 
Sample consists of 145,374 new strategic alliances appearing on Thomson Reuters’ Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum Alliances and Joint Ventures Database from 1990 through 2016.  
Panel A. All Strategic Alliances 
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Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for my broader sample of alliances covered 
by SDC over my sample period. Panel A presents strategic alliance-level Fama-French 12 
industry distribution and the characteristics of all 116,776 strategic alliances covered by 
SDC Platinum’s Alliances and Joint Ventures database. Strategic alliances occur across all 
industries but are most common in business equipment, financial, and retail industries. 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for voluntarily disclosed strategic alliance 
characteristics for this sample. The average strategic alliance is expected to last for roughly 
ten years (mean ExpectedLength = 9.53). The average total expected cost of strategic 
alliances is $400 million (mean EstAllianceCost = 399.11), and the average estimated joint 
venture capitalization (i.e., assets minus debt) is approximately $150 million (mean 
EstJointVentureCost = 148.90). Appendix B provides excerpts from several strategic 
alliance announcements for the most common types of strategic alliances in my sample, 
and illustrates the considerable heterogeneity in the types of strategic alliances, the scope 
of alliance operations, and the types of alliance partners.    
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Table 1. Strategic Alliance Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the distribution of select variables from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum’s 
Alliances and Joint Ventures database. Panel A presents Fama-French 12 industry classifications of 116,776 
new strategic alliances announced over my sample period. Panel B presents strategic alliance-level 
characteristics that are selectively disclosed by firms and covered by SDC Platinum. ExpectedLength is the 
original expected length of the alliance in years. EstAllianceCost is the estimated cost (in $ millions) that the 
alliance members expect to spend on the alliance. EstJointVentureCost is the estimated capitalization (assets 
minus debt, in $ millions) of the joint venture. Sample period is 1994 through 2014 for all strategic alliances 
covered by SDC. 
 
Panel A. Strategic Alliance Industry Distribution  
Fama-French 12 Industry Groups 
Number of 
Strategic 
Alliances 
% of Strategic 
Alliances 
Business equipment 28,035 24.0% 
Chemicals and allied products 3,213 2.8% 
Consumer durables 3,561 3.1% 
Oil, gas, and coal extraction products 3,971 3.4% 
Healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs 4,735 4.1% 
Manufacturing 7,686 6.6% 
Financial firms 14,275 12.2% 
Consumer nondurables 3,950 3.4% 
Other 29,118 24.9% 
Wholesale, retail, and some services 10,729 9.2% 
Telephone and television transmission 4,999 4.3% 
Utilities 2,504 2.1% 
 116,776 100.00% 
  
Panel B. Strategic Alliance Characteristics 
Variable N Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Strategic Alliance Characteristics with Limited Disclosure 
ExpectedLength 4,075 9.53 11.59 3.00 5.00 10.00 
EstAllianceCost 8,223 399.11 1,697.24 9.50 41.30 200.00 
EstJointVentureCost 5,531 148.90 1,705.29 1.90 7.70 30.00 
  
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in my primary analyses. 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for my pooled sample of all public firms at the 
intersection of the CRSP and Compustat universe, and Panel B provides descriptive 
statistics for the key variables used in my cross-sectional analysis that examines only firms 
that form strategic alliances. Consistent with prior strategic alliance studies (e.g., 
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Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013), approximately 15% of all firm-years in my pooled 
sample involve the formation of at least one new strategic alliance (mean 
StrategicAllianceInd = 0.15). 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the distribution of key variables used in my analysis using all public firm-years available 
in CRSP and Compustat. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
for my pooled sample of all firm-years, and Panel B presents descriptive statistics for key variables used in 
my cross-sectional tests restricted to only firm-years where the firm forms at least one new strategic alliance 
as well as stock return and trading volume descriptive statistics for all announced strategic alliances that are 
included in my sample. Sample period is 1994 through 2014. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99% levels. 
 
Panel A. Pooled Sample 
Variable N Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Strategic Alliance 
Characteristics  
     
StrategicAlliance 115,912 0.18 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 
StrategicAllianceInd 115,912 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Controls       
Size 115,912 5.66 2.21 4.03 5.57 7.17 
SalesVol 115,912 0.23 0.26 0.06 0.16 0.30 
BTM 115,912 0.66 0.64 0.29 0.53 0.86 
Leverage 115,912 0.55 0.27 0.34 0.55 0.76 
ROA 115,912 –0.04 0.24 –0.02 0.02 0.06 
SpecItems 115,912 –0.02 0.06 –0.01 0.00 0.00 
Loss 115,912 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Returns 115,912 0.14 0.64 –0.24 0.05 0.35 
IdioVol 115,912 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.16 
NumSegments 115,912 2.40 1.95 1.00 2.00 3.00 
R&D-to-Sales 115,912 0.20 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 
       Public Disclosure Measures      
VolDisc 115,912 3.14 6.56 0.00 0.00 3.00 
CapExDisc 115,912 0.38 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SalesDisc 115,912 0.83 2.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ProductionDisc 115,912 2.17 1.95 0.00 2.40 3.89 
MarketDemandDisc 115,912 0.80 1.15 0.00 0.00 1.61 
       Competition Measures       
HHI 115,912 –2.51 1.51 –2.88 –2.15 –1.46 
Log(NumFirms) 115,912 6.67 0.69 6.31 6.76 7.25 
MktShareTop5 115,912 –0.26 0.09 –0.29 –0.25 –0.18 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
Panel B. Strategic Alliance Sample 
Variable N Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Strategic Alliance Firm-Year 
Characteristics      
NewStrategicAlliances 17,056 4.10 9.52 1.00 2.00 4.00 
Competitors 17,056 1.82 3.85 0.00 1.00 2.00 
NParticipants 17,056 2.11 0.28 2.00 2.00 2.00 
JointVenture 17,056 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
HighInfo 17,056 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LowInfo 17,056 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TerminatedAlliances 17,056 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 In Panel A of Table 2, the average management forecast frequency (VolDisc) in my 
sample is 3.14 forecasts per year. My sample firms have an average book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) of 0.66, leverage ratio (Leverage) of 0.55, return-on-assets (ROA) of –0.04, special 
items (SpecItems) of –0.02, idiosyncratic volatility (IdioVol) of 0.12, and stock returns 
(Returns) of 0.12 during the previous fiscal year.  
 Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for my sample of unique firm-
years where the firm forms at least one new strategic alliance during the fiscal year. In this 
restricted sample, 38% entered into at least one formal equity-based joint venture that 
formed a new legal business entity (mean JointVenture = 0.38), the average alliance 
contains two participants (mean NParticipants = 2.11), the average firm enters two 
alliances with direct competitors in the same industry (mean Competitor = 1.82). In total, 
36% of these firms entered at least one strategic alliance where the primary activity of the 
alliance was to pursue manufacturing, production, or R&D-related activities (mean 
HighInfo = 0.36), and 17% of these firms entered at least one strategic alliance where the 
primary activity was to license products, services, or technology (mean LowInfo = 0.17). 
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Research Design and Results 
 In order to triangulate evidence of the relation between strategic alliances and 
voluntary disclosure, I use multiple measures of voluntary disclosure that theory and 
institutional features suggest are useful for coordination purposes, and employ three 
distinct sets of tests. I first examine the relation between firms’ strategic alliance activity 
and voluntary disclosure, using both pooled cross-sectional and within-firm research 
designs. The advantage of this approach is that it uses a broad sample of firms to compare 
firms that form strategic alliances to those that do not form strategic alliances.    
Next, I examine the subsample of firms that form at least one strategic alliance 
during the year, and exploit heterogeneity in the degree of private communication between 
strategic alliance partners based on the economic and contractual characteristics of their 
new alliances. I also test for cross-sectional differences based on industry characteristics in 
my pooled tests that examine the relation between strategic alliances and voluntary 
disclosure for all firms. These tests allow me to compare the moderating effect of industry 
competition on the relation between public disclosure and strategic alliances for firms that 
enter into strategic alliances relative to firms that do not form strategic alliances.  
Finally, I use the staggered adoption of combined reporting rules in different states 
at different times as an exogenous shock to the incentives to form strategic alliances. My 
research designs discussed above take firms’ strategic alliance activity as exogenous, and 
assume that the coordination benefits of private communication are not a first-order 
determinant—but rather are an incidental by-product—of strategic alliance formation that 
affects firms’ public disclosures. In contrast, this final research design allows me to relax 
that maintained assumption to assess whether my results continue to hold in a setting that 
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involves arguably exogenous variation in firms’ strategic alliance activity. Using a 
generalized difference-in-differences research design, I estimate the change in voluntary 
disclosure for firms affected by combined reporting rules that increased the incentives to 
form strategic alliances, relative to unaffected firms.   
4.1. Strategic alliance formation and public disclosure 
4.1.1. Research design 
In order to test my primary predictions, I examine the relation between firms’ public 
voluntary disclosure behavior and strategic alliance activity while controlling for the 
known determinants of firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. In particular, I estimate the 
following model on a pooled sample of all firm-years in my sample: 
VolDisci,t+1 = α + β1 StrategicAlliancei,t + θ Controls + ε,                                  (1) 
where VolDisc is one of several measures of quantitative (i.e., management capital 
expenditure or sales forecasts) or qualitative voluntary disclosure about expected 
production or market demand. I first measure VolDisc using the number of management 
forecasts (e.g., earnings, revenue, investment, etc.) provided during the subsequent fiscal 
year. Management forecasts reduce uncertainty for external parties (e.g., investors, 
competitors) by providing information about the firm’s future business conditions. I also 
disaggregate management forecasts into sales forecasts and investment forecasts 
(SalesDisc and CapEx forecasts, respectively), since this type of information is particularly 
useful in reducing competitors’ uncertainty about the firm’s future production decisions. 
StrategicAlliance is a continuous measure of a firm’s new total strategic alliance activity 
during the year, following prior corporate finance and management studies (e.g., Bodnaruk, 
Massa, and Simonov, 2013; Li, Qiu, and Wang, 2018), defined as the natural logarithm of 
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one plus the total number of new strategic alliances the firm entered during the fiscal year.9 
Controls is a vector of the following firm-year level controls: Size, SalesVol, BTM, 
Leverage, ROA, SpecItems, Loss, Returns, IdioVol, NumSegments, and R&D-to-Sales (e.g., 
Ali, Klasa, and Yeung, 2014; Guay, Samuels, and Taylor, 2016). 
I also estimate Eq. (1) using multiple qualitative measures of firms’ public 
disclosure topics that are likely relevant for coordination purposes. In particular, I scrape 
all 8-Ks filed with the SEC for keywords related to firms’ production quantities, pricing, 
and investment plans (ProductionDisc), as well as firms’ discussions of expected demand 
and market conditions (MarketDemandDisc). While these disclosures are not quantitative 
like my previous measures, prior accounting research shows that word-frequency measures 
of firms’ public disclosures capture qualitative information that quantitative measures of 
disclosure are unable to (e.g., Henry and Leone, 2015; Loughran and McDonald, 2016). A 
key advantage of this measurement choice is that the language I use to measure firms’ 
qualitative disclosure topics is consistent with the information that antitrust regulators  are 
primarily concerned with that facilitate coordination between firms (e.g., OECD, 2010; 
FTC, 2011; NERA, 2014), and is also consistent with economic theory about the types of 
public disclosures that are most likely to facilitate coordination—namely information about 
expected investment and production decisions and market demand (e.g., Fried, 1985; 
Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; Bertomeu and Liang, 2015; Arya and Mittendorf, 2016).10 
                                                            
9 All of my tabulated results are qualitatively similar—i.e., of the same sign and level of significance—using 
an indicator for whether the firm entered into at least one strategic alliance during the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise, to measure StrategicAlliance (e.g., Fich, Starks, and Yore, 2014).  
10 While public voluntary disclosure about expected demand and production is one way that competitors can 
exchange information to coordinate their actions, firms could also use personal interactions between 
executives at conferences, discussions in mandatory disclosures (e.g., the MD&A section of an annual 
report), or other forms of communication (e.g., conference calls) to publicly exchange information that may 
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I also augment each model separately with industry and firm fixed effects to control 
for time-invariant differences across industries and firms, respectively. Industry fixed 
effects control for time-invariant unobserved differences across industries that affect firms’ 
strategic alliance activity (e.g., firms in more research-intensive industries are inherently 
more likely to form strategic alliances). Firm fixed effects control for time-invariant firm 
characteristics that may affect whether firms form strategic alliances. Thus, including firm 
fixed effects identifies the relation between strategic alliances and disclosure based on 
within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in strategic alliance activity. Throughout all of my 
analyses, I calculate standard errors clustered by firm to allow for autocorrelation in firms’ 
disclosure behavior over time within a given firm.  
4.1.2. Results 
 Table 3 presents results from estimating Eq. (1) using my quantitative measures of 
public disclosure. Across all specifications, for each measure of quantitative disclosure 
(i.e., VolDisc, CapExDisc, and SalesDisc, respectively), I find a negative relation between 
StrategicAlliance and public disclosure (StrategicAlliance; coeffs –1.093, –0.509, –0.294, 
–0.135, –0.224, –0.098; t-stats –12.32, –7.61, –10.56, –6.19, –16.09, –7.21).11 These results 
                                                            
be useful for coordinating their production and pricing decisions. Each of these methods entails different 
costs and benefits and firms likely simultaneously employ several forms of communication to exchange 
information in order to coordinate their production and investment activities. In this study, however, I 
explicitly focus on voluntary disclosure about expected demand and production since economic theory 
provides clear empirical predictions for how coordination benefits affect firms’ voluntary disclosures of 
information about future expected business conditions, whereas empirical evidence supporting these theories 
is limited at best.  
11 In order to provide a clear interpretation of the economic magnitude of these results, I re-estimate Eq. (1)—
after including industry fixed effects—using an indicator for whether the firm formed at least one strategic 
alliance during the fiscal year (StrategicAllianceInd). In untabulated results, the coefficient on 
StrategicAllianceInd is –0.935 (t-stat –9.21), suggesting that firms that enter into strategic alliances provide 
one fewer management forecasts during the subsequent year—approximately 15% of my sample standard 
deviation of VolDisc—relative to firms that do not form strategic alliances, all else equal.  
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suggest that both  cross-sectionally and when using the firm as its own control (i.e., 
including firm fixed effects in columns (2), (4), and (6)), strategic alliances are negatively 
associated with firms’ public voluntary disclosure. Importantly, in columns (3) through (6) 
I find that these effects are also present using measures of capital expenditure and sales 
forecasts, which are the types of forecasts that are most likely to be useful for coordination 
purposes.12 Collectively, these results provide consistent evidence that firms that enter 
strategic alliances subsequently reduce their quantitative public disclosures.13  
 Table 4 presents results from estimating Eq. (1) using textual analysis-based 
qualitative measures of public disclosure. Across all specifications, for each measure of 
qualitative public disclosure (i.e., ProductionDisc and MarketDemandDisc, respectively), 
I find a negative relation between StrategicAlliance and firms’ qualitative topic of public 
disclosure (StrategicAlliance; coeffs –0.158, –0.098, –0.034, –0.023; t-stats –5.47, –5.98, 
–2.53, –2.28). These results suggest that in both pooled cross-section and within-firm 
designs, firms’ strategic alliance activity is negatively associated with firms’ public 
disclosures about expected future business conditions.14 Collectively, these results provide 
consistent evidence that firms that enter strategic alliances subsequently reduce their 
quantitative and qualitative public disclosures.   
                                                            
12 All of my results are qualitatively similar—i.e., of the same sign and level of statistical significance—using 
management forecast indicators to measure VolDisc. 
13 I also investigate the timing of the relation between strategic alliances and public disclosure by examining 
the relation between voluntary disclosure and firms’ large alliance shocks (e.g., Armstrong, Glaeser, Huang, 
and Taylor, 2018). Results in Table IA1 indicate that firms begin to reduce their voluntary disclosure during 
the year leading up to the large alliance shock, consistent with private communication during the due 
diligence process substituting for public disclosure.  
14 For instance, in the cross-section (i.e., models including industry fixed effects), a one standard deviation 
increase in strategic alliance activity is associated with a 3.5% (2.5%) reduction in discussion about 
production quantities and investment levels (future business conditions and market demand). 
27 
 
Table 3. Strategic Alliances and Voluntary Disclosure 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on strategic alliance activity. All variables 
are as defined in Appendix A. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed 
effects. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include untabulated firm fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) present results 
using my primary measure of voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). Columns (3) and (4) present results using 
CapExDisc as an alternative measure of voluntary disclosure and Columns (5) and (6) present results using 
SalesDisc as an alternative measure of voluntary disclosure. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent 
Variable: VolDisct+1 SalesDisct+1 CapExDisct+1 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
StrategicAlliance –1.093*** –0.509*** –0.294*** –0.135*** –0.224*** –0.098*** 
 (–12.32) (–7.61) (–10.56) (–6.19) (–16.09) (–7.21) 
Controls       
Size 1.043*** 1.926*** 0.210*** 0.454*** 0.146*** 0.304*** 
 (37.30) (34.54) (25.09) (24.83) (30.15) (25.22) 
SalesVol 0.550*** –1.569*** 0.213*** –0.584*** –0.038 –0.190*** 
 (3.66) (–5.98) (4.24) (–6.46) (–1.57) (–3.87) 
BTM –0.047 1.097*** –0.063*** 0.274*** 0.041*** 0.207*** 
 (–1.00) (22.00) (–4.26) (17.11) (4.41) (18.17) 
Leverage –0.288* 3.722*** –0.298*** 1.015*** 0.190*** 0.610*** 
 (–1.74) (17.20) (–5.52) (14.08) (6.64) (13.69) 
ROA 0.718*** –0.259* 0.351*** 0.075 0.036 –0.103*** 
 (5.64) (–1.67) (7.76) (1.30) (1.62) (–3.88) 
SpecItems –2.248*** 0.490 –0.716*** 0.097 –0.294*** –0.071 
 (–6.49) (1.52) (–5.65) (0.81) (–4.82) (–1.20) 
Loss 0.167** –0.071 0.143*** 0.012 0.020* 0.051*** 
 (2.28) (–1.32) (5.72) (0.62) (1.71) (4.67) 
Returns –0.144*** –0.255*** 0.016 –0.020* –0.032*** –0.061*** 
 (–5.06) (–9.28) (1.50) (–1.96) (–6.38) (–11.25) 
IdioVol –4.406*** –4.899*** –1.688*** –2.050*** –0.492*** –0.364*** 
 (–14.62) (–17.48) (–15.66) (–20.03) (–10.01) (–7.25) 
NumSegments 0.120*** 0.387*** 0.079*** 0.145*** 0.016*** 0.075*** 
 (3.87) (12.05) (7.59) (12.87) (2.68) (10.04) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.271*** –0.143*** –0.088*** –0.077*** –0.010*** 0.002 
 (–12.78) (–5.00) (–11.68) (–6.34) (–3.51) (0.50) 
Fixed Effects industry firm industry firm industry firm 
F 207.7 142.0 137.4 99.03 121.0 74.99 
N 115,912 115,912 115,912 115,912 115,912 115,912 
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Table 4. Strategic Alliances and Topic of Public Disclosure 
This table presents results from regressions of two measures of the topic of 8-K disclosures by firms on 
strategic alliance activity. Columns (1) and (2) present results using firms’ discussions of expected production 
and investment (ProductionDisc) to measure topic of public disclosure. Columns (3) and (4) present results 
using firms’ discussions of expected future business conditions (MarketDemandDisc) to measure topic of 
public disclosure. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Columns (1) and (3) of each panel include 
untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) of each panel include untabulated 
firm fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 
Dependent Variable: ProductionDisct+1 MarketDemandDisct+1 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
StrategicAlliance –0.158*** –0.098*** –0.034** –0.023** 
 (–5.47) (–5.98) (–2.53) (–2.28) 
Controls     
Size 0.258*** 0.394*** 0.077*** 0.098*** 
 (30.53) (33.19) (19.01) (13.66) 
SalesVol 0.373*** –0.028 0.164*** 0.107*** 
 (8.99) (–0.43) (7.07) (2.83) 
BTM 0.034* 0.278*** 0.030*** 0.056*** 
 (1.91) (17.32) (3.24) (5.62) 
Leverage 0.387*** 0.897*** 0.368*** 0.174*** 
 (8.08) (16.36) (15.04) (5.45) 
ROA –0.513*** –0.552*** –0.137*** –0.200*** 
 (–9.64) (–9.84) (–4.98) (–6.26) 
SpecItems 0.031 0.651*** –0.128* 0.255*** 
 (0.24) (5.67) (–1.77) (3.45) 
Loss 0.373*** 0.208*** 0.100*** 0.085*** 
 (17.20) (11.87) (8.23) (7.61) 
Returns 0.051*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.016*** 
 (5.15) (2.86) (4.79) (2.77) 
IdioVol 0.022 –0.082 0.442*** 0.419*** 
 (0.21) (–0.92) (7.60) (7.49) 
NumSegments –0.050*** 0.064*** –0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (–5.93) (8.42) (–4.19) (4.31) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.002 –0.014 –0.028*** –0.008 
 (–0.21) (–1.34) (–6.44) (–1.49) 
Fixed Effects industry firm industry firm 
F 164.5 146.3 77.34 37.99 
N 115,912 115,912 115,912 115,912 
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4.2. The degree of private communication in strategic alliances 
4.2.1. Research design 
I next focus on strategic alliances between firms that likely have reasons to 
coordinate in their separate (i.e., non-alliance) activities and contrast these with strategic 
alliances between firms that are less likely to have reasons to coordinate. Strategic alliances 
that require partners to share information that is more useful for coordinating their business 
activities should lead to a greater reduction in coordination benefits to public disclosure for 
these firms. Therefore, I expect the reduction in voluntary disclosure to be more 
pronounced for firms that form alliances that involve greater private communication of 
information that is useful for coordination. To test this prediction, I restrict my analysis to 
the subsample of firms-years that form at least one strategic alliance during the year and 
re-estimate Eq. (1) after interacting StrategicAlliance with measures of strategic alliance 
deal characteristics that prior management studies (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000) use to 
capture the degree of information exchange between alliance partners in the following 
specification: 
VolDisci,t+1 = α + β1 PrivateInfoi,t × StrategicAlliancei,t + β2 PrivateInfoi,t 
+ β3 StrategicAlliancei,t + θ Controls + ε.                                    (2) 
I measure PrivateInfo in Eq. (2) using four distinct variables that capture the degree of 
private information exchange in strategic alliances, and expect a more negative association 
between strategic alliances and voluntary disclosure for firms that enter into alliances with 
these characteristics (i.e., β1 < 0). 
First, theory predicts that public disclosure plays a more prominent coordination 
role for firms that compete in the same product market (e.g., Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997). 
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Importantly, strategic alliances often consist of firms that directly compete in their 
respective product markets. This observation suggests that strategic alliances between 
direct competitors are more likely to involve the exchange of information that is beneficial 
for coordination (e.g., Teece, 1992). I measure the total number of direct competitors that 
firms form strategic alliances with (Competitor) as my first measure of PrivateInfo. 
Second, while most strategic alliances involve only two firms, it is not uncommon 
to find alliances between three or more firms. When firms enter alliances with a greater 
number of participants, they are able to share more and a broader range of information. I 
measure the average number of participants involved in each of the firm’s new alliances 
formed during the fiscal year (NParticipants) as my second measure of PrivateInfo. 
Third, although strategic alliances take a variety of contractual forms in practice, 
one of the most common forms involve joint ventures, in which firms mutually commit 
resources and form a separate legal business entity that they each retain ownership and 
control rights over to pursue a project (Kogut, 1988). Several management studies argue 
that joint ventures represent a more hierarchical form of strategic alliance that more closely 
resembles a fully-integrated firm and leads to a greater degree of information sharing 
between partners (e.g., Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Reuer and 
Koza, 2000; Anderson, Christ, Dekker, and Sedatole, 2014). I use an indicator for whether 
the firm forms at least one joint venture during the fiscal year (JointVenture) as my third 
measure of PrivateInfo. 
Finally, Robinson and Stuart (2007), Dyer, Kale, and Singh (2001), and Anand and 
Khanna (2000) suggest that strategic alliances that involve R&D or manufacturing 
activities create stronger information sharing networks among alliance partners than do 
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many other types of alliances (e.g., supply or licensing agreements), since the complexity 
of R&D and manufacturing activities often require firms to learn more about their partners’ 
operations. I use an indicator that equals one if the firm forms at least one alliance during 
the fiscal year that involves either R&D or manufacturing activities (HighInfo) as my fourth 
measure of PrivateInfo. 
4.2.2. Results 
Table 5 presents results from estimating Eq. (2). For parsimony I do not report 
coefficients on control variables. In columns (1) through (4), for each of my four measures 
of PrivateInfo, I find that the coefficient on the interaction PrivateInfo × StrategicAlliance 
is negative and significantly related to firms’ quantitative public voluntary disclosures 
(PrivateInfo × StrategicAlliance; coeffs –0.281, –2.429, –1.526, –0.699; t-stats –2.77, –
7.12, –5.68, –2.42). Moreover, columns (5) through (8) indicate that each of these results 
continues to hold when using my primary measure of qualitative topic of voluntary 
disclosure (ProductionDisclosure) as the dependent variable (PrivateInfo × 
StrategicAlliance; coeffs –0.072, –0.430, –0.398, –0.485; t-stats –2.48, –3.20, –4.44, –
5.14). These results indicate that the relation between strategic alliances and voluntary 
disclosure is more pronounced for firms that enter into strategic alliances that involve 
private communication that involves more relevant information for coordination purposes, 
consistent with a greater reduction in the coordination benefits of disclosure for firms that 
enter into these types of strategic alliances.   
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Table 5. Cross Sectional Tests: The Degree of Private Communication in Strategic 
Alliances 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on strategic alliance activity conditional 
on the degree of private information exchange involved in firms’ strategic alliances, for a sample of firms 
that form at least one new strategic alliance during the fiscal year. All variables are as defined in Appendix 
A. Columns (1) through (4) present results using my primary measure of voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). 
Columns (5) through (8) present results using firms’ discussion of expected production and investment 
(ProductionDisc) to measure topic of public disclosure. Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) present results using 
the count of the number of direct competitors that the firm formed strategic alliances with (Competitor), the 
average number of participants in each of the firms new strategic alliances (NParticipants), an indicator for 
whether the firm forms at least one equity-based joint venture during the year (JointVenture), and an indicator 
for whether the firm formed at least one R&D or manufacturing alliance during the year (HighInfo) to 
measure PrivateInfo, respectively. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. Each 
model includes untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A. Quantitative Measure of Public Disclosure 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct+1 
Measure of PrivateInfo:  Competitor NParticipants  JointVenture HighInfo 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PrivateInfo × StrategicAlliance –0.281*** –2.429*** –1.526*** –0.699** 
 (–2.77) (–7.12) (–5.68) (–2.42) 
PrivateInfo 0.628** 0.994** 0.379 –0.554 
 (2.55) (2.19) (1.11) (–1.42) 
StrategicAlliance –1.642*** 3.366*** –1.031*** –1.473*** 
 (–8.34) (4.21) (–4.45) (–7.13) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Fixed Effects industry industry industry industry 
F 52.38 55.47 53.73 56.23 
N 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 
 
Panel B. Topic of Public Disclosure 
Dependent Variable: ProductionDisct+1 
Measure of PrivateInfo:  Competitor NParticipants JointVenture HighInfo 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PrivateInfo × StrategicAlliance –0.072** –0.430*** –0.398*** –0.485*** 
 (–2.48) (–3.20) (–4.44) (–5.14) 
PrivateInfo 0.162** 0.087 0.070 0.260** 
 (2.32) (0.52) (0.62) (2.27) 
StrategicAlliance –0.155*** 0.714** 0.020 0.028 
 (–2.73) (2.49) (0.32) (0.46) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Fixed Effects industry industry industry industry 
F 23.57 27.23 30.44 28.68 
N 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 
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4.3. Limited private communication in strategic alliances 
4.3.1. Research design 
While the preceding results focus on alliances that involve a greater degree of 
private communication among partners, certain types of alliances characteristics are less 
likely to facilitate extensive private communication between alliance partners, and I do not 
expect firms entering strategic alliances with these types of characteristics to reduce their 
public disclosure by as much. For this analysis, I re-estimate Eq. (2) after replacing 
PrivateInfo with two characteristics of firms’ strategic alliances that involve limited private 
information exchange between strategic alliance partners (LimitedPrivateInfo).  
First, prior management literature shows that licensing alliances involve the least 
amount of information spillovers between firms. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) 
show that licensing alliances—i.e., alliances that involve firms cross-licensing their 
proprietary technology to each other—are the least likely types of alliances to facilitate 
information exchange due to the proprietary nature of the products, technology, or services 
being licensed. Therefore, I expect a weaker negative association between strategic 
alliances and voluntary disclosure for firms that enter licensing alliances. In this regard, 
my empirical tests associated with this prediction can be viewed as “falsification tests.” I 
use an indicator that equals one if the firm forms at least one exclusive licensing alliance 
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise (LowInfo) as my first measure of 
LimitedPrivateInfo. 
Second, I also expect firms that terminate their alliance relationships altogether—
and therefore sever their private communication channels with their partners—to 
subsequently increase their voluntary disclosures. In this regard, my empirical tests 
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associated with this prediction can be viewed as “treatment reversal tests.” I use the total 
number of terminated alliances announced during the fiscal year (TerminatedAlliances) as 
my second measure of LimitedPrivateInfo.  
4.3.2. Results 
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that firms that enter low information-
sharing alliances are not more likely to reduce their public disclosures (LowInfo × 
StrategicAlliance; coeffs –0.096, 0.065; t-stats –0.34, 0.68 in columns (1) and (3), 
respectively). Moreover, for each of my primary measures of quantitative and qualitative 
public disclosure, I find that firms that also announce strategic alliance terminations reduce 
their public disclosures by less (TerminatedAlliance × StrategicAlliance; coeffs 0.642, 
0.164; t-stats 2.67, 1.63 in columns (2) and (4), respectively). These results indicate that 
the observed relation between strategic alliances and public disclosure is less pronounced 
for firms that enter strategic alliances that involve limited private information exchange.  
Table 6. Falsification Test: Limited Private Communication in Strategic Alliances 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on strategic alliance activity conditional 
measures of limited information exchange between strategic alliance partners, for a sample of firms that form 
at least one new strategic alliance during the fiscal year. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Columns 
(1) and (2) present results using my primary measure of voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). Columns (3) and (4) 
present results using firms’ discussion of expected production and investment (ProductionDisc) to measure 
topic of public disclosure. Columns (1) and (2) present results using an indicator for whether the firm forms 
at least one exclusive licensing alliance during the year (LowInfo) and the count of the number of terminated 
alliances announced by the firm during the year (TerminatedAlliances) to measure LimitedPrivateInfo, 
respectively. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. Each model includes 
untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by 
firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Falsification Test: Limited Private Communication in Strategic Alliances 
(cont’d) 
 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct+1 ProductionDisct+1 
Measure of 
LimitedPrivateInfo:  LowInfo TerminatedAlliances LowInfo TerminatedAlliances 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LimitedPrivateInfo × 
StrategicAlliance –0.096 0.642*** 0.065 0.164 
 (–0.34) (2.67) (0.68) (1.63) 
LimitedPrivateInfo –1.663*** –1.987*** –0.314** –0.492** 
 (–4.17) (–3.71) (–2.44) (–2.36) 
StrategicAlliance –1.705*** –2.023*** –0.229*** –0.247*** 
 (–8.59) (–11.09) (–3.90) (–4.50) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Fixed Effects industry industry industry industry 
F 55.69 52.91 25.29 24.36 
N 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 
  
4.4. Strategic alliances and industry characteristics: the degree of product market 
competition 
4.4.1. Research design 
An important prediction from Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) and Bertomeu and 
Liang (2015) is that the coordination benefits of disclosure are decreasing in the intensity 
of product market competition, as firms in more competitive industries benefit more from 
concealing information about expected demand from their competitors. For instance, in the 
context of Clinch and Verrecchia (1997), if a firm in a more competitive industry discloses 
information about stronger than expected demand, this is more likely to induce its 
competitors to cut their prices in the current period. Therefore, the coordination benefits of 
disclosure are lower in more competitive industries. To the extent that strategic alliances 
reduce the coordination benefits of disclosure, I expect a weaker association between 
strategic alliances and voluntary disclosure for firms in more competitive industries. I test 
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for such a moderating effect of product market competition by interacting StrategicAlliance 
in Eq. (1) with measures of product market competition in the following specification: 
VolDisci,t+1 = α + β1 Competitioni,t × StrategicAlliancei,t + β2 Competitioni,t  
+ β3 StrategicAlliancei,t + θ Controls + ε.                                      (3) 
 I measure Competition using the following three measures: (i) HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman measure of industry concentration (as a percentage), (ii) Log(NumberFirms) is 
the natural logarithm of the total number of firms in the industry, and (iii) MktShareTop5 
is the five-firm concentration ratio, measured as the market share of the five largest firms 
based on sales. I calculate all three competition measures annually based on Fama-French-
12 industry groups.15 To facilitate comparison across the measures, I use the negative value 
of HHI and MarketShare so that all three measures of Competition are increasing in the 
degree of product market competition. If firms in more competitive industries are less 
likely to use public disclosure to coordinate prior to strategic alliance formation, I expect 
to find β1 > 0.16  
4.4.2. Results 
Table 7 presents results from estimating Eq. (3). For each measure of Competition, 
I find that the coefficient on the interaction term Competition × StrategicAlliance is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure (coeffs 0.249, 0.287, 4.103, 0.096, 0.182, 
                                                            
15 All of my results are qualitatively similar—i.e., of the same sign and level of statistical significance—when 
using finer definitions of industry membership (e.g., two-digit SIC codes) to measure Competition when 
estimating Eq. (3). 
16 In supplementary analyses, I also explore cross-sectional settings where managers likely have more 
discretion in using public disclosure as a coordination mechanism—when their firms’ ex ante information 
environment is already sufficiently rich. Results presented in Table IA2 suggest that my findings are 
concentrated among firms with higher quality external information, consistent with these firms having a 
lower cost of removing public disclosure.  
37 
 
1.779; t-stats 6.24, 2.77, 5.64, 4.55, 4.21, 4.97, respectively), indicating that the reduction 
in firms’ voluntary disclosure for firms that enter strategic alliances is muted in more 
competitive industries. Collectively, these results are consistent with theories suggesting 
that the coordination benefit of public information exchange is decreasing in the degree of 
product market competition. 
Table 7. Cross Sectional Tests: Industry Characteristics 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on strategic alliance activity conditional 
on product market competition. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Columns (1) through (3) present 
results using my primary measure of voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). Columns (4) through (6) present results 
using firms’ discussion of expected production and investment (ProductionDisc) to measure topic of public 
disclosure. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present results using Herfindahl-Hirschman industry concentration 
multiplied by (–1) (HHI), the natural log of the number of firms in the industry (Log(NumFirms)), and the 
five-firm concentration ratio multiplied by (–1) (MktShareTop5) to measure Competition, respectively. Panel 
B presents results for information quality. Columns (1) and (2) present results using my primary measure of 
voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. Each model 
includes untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A. Quantitative Measure of Public Disclosure 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct+1 
Measure of Competition:  HHI Log(NumFirms) MktShareTop5 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Competition × StrategicAlliance 0.249*** 0.287*** 4.103*** 
 (6.24) (2.77) (5.64) 
Competition –0.071 –10.427*** –6.520*** 
 (–0.92) (–44.77) (–5.97) 
StrategicAlliance –0.398*** –2.502*** 0.055 
 (–2.61) (–3.60) (0.24) 
Controls yes yes yes 
Fixed Effects industry industry industry 
F 179.1 238.0 179.1 
N 115,912 115,912 115,912 
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Table 7. Cross Sectional Tests: Industry Characteristics (cont’d) 
Panel B. Topic of Public Disclosure 
Dependent Variable: ProductionDisct+1 
Measure of Competition:  HHI Log(NumFirms) MktShareTop5 
Variable (4) (5) (6) 
Competition × StrategicAlliance 0.096*** 0.182*** 1.779*** 
 (4.55) (4.21) (4.97) 
Competition –0.127*** –2.293*** –4.073*** 
 (–6.00) (–45.44) (–12.92) 
StrategicAlliance 0.109* –1.254*** 0.341*** 
 (1.80) (–4.27) (3.44) 
Controls yes yes yes 
Fixed Effects industry industry industry 
F 143.1 338.4 151.8 
N 115,912 115,912 115,912 
 
4.5. Quasi-natural experiment: staggered adoption of combined reporting regimes 
4.5.1 Research design 
 In my final set of tests, I use the staggered adoption of combined reporting tax rules 
in various states as an arguably exogenous shock that increased firms’ incentives to form 
strategic alliances. My prior tests take firms’ strategic alliance activity as exogenous from 
the perspective of my research question, and assume that the coordination benefits of 
private communication are an incidental by-product of strategic alliances that affects firms’ 
public disclosures. These tests allow me to assess whether my results continue to hold in a 
setting that involves arguably exogenous variation in firms’ strategic alliance activity (e.g., 
Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013; Li, Qiu, and Wang, 2018).  
During my sample period, many states adopted combined reporting rules for 
corporate state tax purposes that reduced the opportunity cost of forming strategic alliances. 
Under separate reporting rules, firms with operations in multiple states are able to shift 
income of their most profitable operations to states with lower corporate tax rates (e.g., 
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Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013; Armstrong, Glaeser, and Kepler, 2018). However, 
combined reporting rules require the firm to report its total domestic income and pay state 
income taxes based on the proportion of its activity in that state. Thus, combined reporting 
rules limit multi-state firms’ ability to shift income to subsidiaries located in states with 
lower corporate tax rates, which reduces firms’ incentives to rely on internal capital 
markets to be able to transfer assets across subsidiaries to minimize their state taxes 
(Mazerov, 2002, 2009).17 Firms that allocate capital to strategic alliances are unable to 
engage in such asset transfers in the first place, which represent a major “opportunity cost” 
of engaging in strategic alliances (Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013; Li, Qiu, and 
Wang, 2018). Thus, by impeding firms’ ability to transfer assets across state lines to reduce 
their tax burdens, combined reporting rules reduce the cost of forming strategic alliances 
and increase firms’ incentives to form strategic alliances. Figure 2 reports the states that 
adopted combined reporting rules during my sample period. 
 
  
                                                            
17 In particular, Mazerov (2009) notes that “[b]y requiring corporate parents and subsidiaries to add their 
profits together, combined reporting states are able to nullify a variety of tax-avoidance strategies large 
multistate corporations have devised to artificially move profits out of the states in which they are earned and 
into states in which they will be taxed at lower rates.”  
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Figure 2. Combined Reporting Regime Staggered Adoption 
This figure presents the geographic distribution of states requiring combined reporting of corporate income 
(Mazerov, 2009; Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013). Sixteen U.S. states (grey) adopted combined 
reporting prior to the start of my sample period in 1994 and nine states plus the District of Columbia (striped) 
adopted combined reporting during my sample period between 1994 and 2012.  
 
 
 
State 
Combined 
Reporting 
Adoption Year  State 
Combined 
Reporting 
Adoption Year 
Alaska < 1994  Minnesota < 1994 Arizona < 1994  Montana < 1994 California < 1994  Nebraska < 1994 Colorado < 1994  New Hampshire < 1994 District of Columbia 2011  New York 2007 Georgia 2010  North Carolina 2012 Hawaii < 1994  North Dakota < 1994 Idaho < 1994  Oregon < 1994 Illinois < 1994  Texas 2008 Kansas < 1994  Utah < 1994 Maine < 1994  Vermont 2006 Massachusetts 2008  West Virginia 2009 Michigan 2008  Wisconsin 2009 
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In order to implement these tests, I estimate the following generalized difference-
in-differences specification: 
VolDisci,t = α + β1 CombinedReportingRegimei,t + θ Controls + δi + γt + ε.       (4) 
I use both quantitative and qualitative measures of disclosure (i.e., VolDisc and 
ProductionDisc, respectively) when estimating Eq. (4). CombinedReportingRegime is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm’s headquarters for a given firm-year is located in a state 
that has adopted combined reporting rules, and zero otherwise. I obtain information on 
firms’ state of headquarters from the authors of Jennings, Lee, and Matsumoto (2017), who 
“scrape” firm’s annual 10-K filings to identify each firm’s current headquarter state each 
year.18 When estimating Eq. (4) I include firm fixed effects (δi) to control for time-invariant 
firm characteristics (e.g., since certain types of firms are inherently more likely to form 
alliances), and I include year fixed effects (γt) to control for macroeconomic shocks and 
time trends (e.g., the increasing trend over my sample period for states to adopt combined 
reporting rules). I also re-estimate Eq. (4) after augmenting each model with state 
headquarter fixed effects to control for systematic differences across firms headquartered 
in different states (e.g., differences in local industry clustering across states; Armstrong, 
Glaeser, Huang, and Taylor, 2018). All other variables are as previously defined.  
4.5.2. Results 
                                                            
18 All of my results from estimating Eq. (4) are qualitatively similar—i.e., of the same sign and level of 
statistical significance—if I use a subsidiary-weighted average measure of firms’ exposure to states that adopt 
combined reporting rules in lieu of CombinedReportingRegime. I obtain information on firms’ subsidiary 
locations from the authors of Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2013), who scrape firms’ Exhibit 21 filings 
with the SEC for the states of firms’ material subsidiaries.  
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Table 8 presents results from implementing my quasi-natural experiment. Panel A 
presents descriptive statistics for the treatment variable, CombinedReportingRegime. 
Across my entire sample, 38% of firm-years are headquartered in states that have adopted 
combined reporting rules. Panel B presents univariate differences for firms’ strategic 
alliance activity and voluntary disclosure conditional on CombinedReportingRegime. 
Panel B1 presents the average likelihood that the firm forms at least one new strategic 
alliance conditional on whether it is headquartered in a combined reporting regime state. 
Results indicate that firms are 2 percentage points (= 0.15 – 0.13) more likely to form 
strategic alliances when headquartered in states that have adopted combined reporting 
regimes. Panel B2 presents univariate differences in my primary and alternate measures of 
firms’ voluntary disclosure (VolDisc and ProductionDisc) conditional on whether it (i) 
forms new strategic alliances during the fiscal year (StrategicAllianceInd) and (ii) is 
headquartered in a combined reporting state. Results indicate that firms that are 
headquartered in states that have adopted combined reporting and form new strategic 
alliance, on average, provide less voluntary disclosure than their counterparts that are 
headquartered in states that do not have combined reporting rules (i.e., a difference-in-
differences of –0.31 (–0.21) when using VolDic (ProductionDisc) as a measure of 
voluntary disclosure).  
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Table 8. Quasi-Natural Experiment: Combined Reporting Rules 
This table presents results from a generalized difference-in-differences estimation using state adoption of 
combined reporting rules, following Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2013) and Li, Qiu, and Wang (2018), 
as a shock to the benefits of forming strategic alliances. CombinedReportingRegime is an indicator equal to 
one if the firm is headquartered in a state that has adopted combined reporting rules, and zero otherwise, 
using firms’ state of headquarter data from Jennings, Lee, and Matsumoto (2017). All other variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the treatment variable, 
CombinedReportingRegime. Panel B presents univariate differences for firms’ strategic alliance activity and 
voluntary disclosure conditional on CombinedReportingRegime. Panel B1 presents the average likelihood 
that the firm forms at least one new strategic alliance conditional on whether it is headquartered in a combined 
reporting regime state or not. Panel B2 presents univariate differences in my primary and alternate measures 
firms’ voluntary disclosure (VolDisc and ProductionDisc) conditional on (i) whether it forms new strategic 
alliances during the fiscal year (NewStrategicAlliance) as well as (ii) whether it is headquartered in a 
combined reporting state or not. Panel C presents results from a generalized difference-in-differences 
estimate with untabulated firm and year fixed effects in columns (1) and (3) and untabulated firm, year, and 
state headquarter fixed effects in columns (2) and (4). Columns (1) and (2) of Panel C presents results using 
my primary measure of voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). Columns (3) and (4) of Panel C presents results using 
firms’ discussion of expected production and investment (ProductionDisc) to measure topic of public 
disclosure. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994 through 2012. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
CombinedReportingRegime 94,477 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Panel B1. Combined Reporting Rules and Differences in Strategic Alliance Activity 
 
Mean StrategicAllianceInd  
 
Non-Combined 
Reporting Regime 
Combined 
Reporting Regime  Diff. [p-value] 
0.13 0.15 0.02***  [<0.001] 
 
Panel B2. Univariate Difference-in-Differences of Public Disclosure 
 
Non-Combined 
Reporting 
Regime 
Combined 
Reporting 
Regime   
 
 Mean VolDisc Diff. [p-value] 
StrategicAllianceInd = 0 2.11 3.39   1.28***  [<0.001] 
StrategicAllianceInd = 1 3.40 4.37   0.97***  [<0.001] 
Diff. 
[p-value] 
     1.29*** 
        [<0.001] 
      0.98***  
        [<0.001] 
 –0.31*** 
[<0.001] 
Diff.-in-Diff.  
[p-value] 
    
 Mean ProductionDisc   
StrategicAllianceInd = 0 2.24 2.57       0.33*** [<0.001] 
StrategicAllianceInd = 1 2.73 2.85      0.12*** [<0.001] 
Diff. 
[p-value] 
     0.49*** 
        [<0.001] 
      0.28*** 
        [<0.001] 
    –0.21*** 
[<0.001] 
Diff.-in-Diff.  
[p-value] 
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Panel C presents results from estimating Eq. (4). Columns (1) and (2) of Panel C 
present results using my primary measure of voluntary disclosure (VolDisc). Column (3) 
and (4) of Panel C presents results using firms’ discussion of expected production and 
investment (ProductionDisc) to measure the topic of public disclosure. Columns (1) and 
(3) present results with firm and year fixed effects, and Columns (2) and (4) present results 
with firm, year, and state fixed effects. Across each specification, I find that firms subject 
to combined reporting rules subsequently reduce their quantitative and qualitative public 
disclosures (CombinedReportingRegime; coeffs –0.317; –0.351; –0.107; –0.110; t-stats –
2.01; –1.89; –3.46; –3.34).19,20  
 
  
                                                            
19 The coefficient on CombinedReportingRegime in column (1) of Panel C of –0.317 represents 
approximately 5% of my sample standard deviation of management forecast frequency. 
20 I also re-estimate Eq. (4) using a two-stage least squares procedure using CombinedReportingRegime as 
an instrument for StrategicAlliance. In untabulated analyses, I find that CombinedReportingRegime has a 
significant positive relation with StrategicAlliance in the first-stage, and the instrumented StrategicAlliance 
in the second-stage has a significant negative relation with my primary measures of public disclosure (i.e., 
VolDisc and ProductionDisc).  
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Table 8. Quasi-Natural Experiment: Combined Reporting Rules (cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Generalized Difference-in-Differences  
Dependent Variable: VolDisct ProductionDisct 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CombinedReportingRegi
me –0.317** –0.351* –0.107*** –0.110*** 
 (–2.01) (–1.89) (–3.46) (–3.34) 
Controls     
Size 0.794*** 0.798*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 
 (15.00) (15.07) (23.12) (22.90) 
SalesVol –1.056*** –1.059*** 0.343*** 0.342*** 
 (–4.03) (–4.04) (5.93) (5.91) 
BTM 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 
 (9.10) (9.10) (8.15) (8.12) 
Leverage 1.435*** 1.483*** 0.669*** 0.670*** 
 (6.54) (6.79) (12.77) (12.84) 
ROA 0.514*** 0.530*** –0.181*** –0.176*** 
 (3.36) (3.47) (–3.56) (–3.47) 
SpecItems –1.381*** –1.410*** –0.299*** –0.301*** 
 (–4.57) (–4.67) (–2.74) (–2.77) 
Loss –0.519*** –0.517*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
 (–9.36) (–9.37) (7.83) (7.81) 
Returns –0.467*** –0.467*** –0.063*** –0.062*** 
 (–17.76) (–17.77) (–7.02) (–6.91) 
IdioVol –2.106*** –2.106*** 1.156*** 1.150*** 
 (–8.08) (–8.09) (13.23) (13.15) 
NumSegments 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.018** 0.018** 
 (8.29) (8.36) (2.38) (2.42) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.054 –0.050 0.011 0.011 
 (–1.39) (–1.29) (0.82) (0.77) 
Fixed Effects firm, year firm, year, state firm, year firm, year, state 
F 58.27 58.54 77.40 76.19 
N 94,477 94,477 94,477 94,477 
 
4.6. Additional analyses  
Standard models of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1986; 
Verrecchia, 1990) suggest four general economic forces that lead to a reduction in 
voluntary disclosure: (i) an increase in bad news, (ii) an increase in proprietary costs, (iii) 
a decrease in managers’ private information, and (iv) a decrease in investors’ uncertainty. 
To explain my collective results, these forces would need to systematically vary with firms’ 
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strategic alliance activity, with the attributes of strategic alliances, with product market 
competition, and with the staggered adoption of combined reporting rules. While I view 
this as unlikely, nevertheless, I conduct a number of additional analyses designed to 
mitigate concerns about these forces in my setting.  
First, with regard to an increase in bad news, I examine capital market reactions to 
strategic alliance announcements. I find that strategic alliance announcements are, on 
average, significant good news events (mean announcement date abnormal return of 
0.43%), see Figure 3. This finding suggests the decline in disclosure is not attributable to 
an increase in bad news. Second, with regard to an increase in proprietary costs, each of 
my tables report similar results for disclosures likely to be proprietary in nature (e.g., 
demand and production information) and disclosures likely to be non-proprietary in nature 
(e.g., management earnings forecasts; e.g., Lang and Sul, 2014; Glaeser, 2018). In addition, 
Table 7 shows that my results are concentrated in less competitive industries––i.e., 
industries commonly thought to have low proprietary costs. These findings suggest the 
decline in disclosure is not attributable to an increase in proprietary costs. Third, with 
regard to a decrease in managers’ private information, in Tables IA3 and IA4, I examine 
(i) the relation between strategic alliances and the accuracy of management forecasts and 
(ii) the relation between strategic alliances and insider trading, respectively. I do not find 
any evidence of a relation between alliance activity and management forecast accuracy, 
but I do find a strong positive relation between alliance activity and insider trading. These 
findings are inconsistent with strategic alliances reducing managers’ private information. 
Finally, with regard to a decrease in investors’ uncertainty, in Table IA5, I examine the 
relation between strategic alliances and the bid/ask spread. I find a strong positive relation 
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between alliance activity and the bid/ask spread. These findings are inconsistent with 
strategic alliances reducing investors’ uncertainty. 
 
Figure 3. Strategic Alliances, Trading Volume, and Abnormal Returns 
This figure plots normalized total trading volume (PublicVolume) and abnormal daily stock returns 
(AllianceAnnouncementReturn) in the [–20, +20] window around the public disclosure of the strategic 
alliances included in my sample. Day 0 is the date of the public disclosure of the strategic alliance 
announcement. Panel A presents average daily normalized  total trading volume (PublicVolume) around the 
public disclosure of the strategic alliance, where PublicVolume is total trading volume minus average daily 
trading volume over my entire sample, scaled by the standard deviation of daily volume over my entire 
sample. Panel B presents average abnormal daily stock return (AllianceAnnouncementReturn) around the 
public disclosure of the strategic alliance. Sample consists of 40,282 strategic alliance announcements for 
firms appearing on Compustat, CRSP, and SDC Platinum’s Alliances and Joint Ventures database from 1994 
to 2014.  
 
Panel A. Strategic Alliance Announcement Normalized Trading Volume 
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Figure 3. Strategic Alliances, Trading Volume, and Abnormal Returns (cont’d) 
Panel B. Strategic Alliance Announcement Abnormal Returns (%) 
 
 
Conclusion 
Theories at the intersection of accounting and industrial organization suggest that 
public disclosure can facilitate coordination among competitors. Much of this literature 
implicitly assumes that competitors cannot privately communicate production and pricing 
decisions and must rely on public disclosures to do so. Building on these theories, I exploit 
data on the extent of private communication between firms within strategic alliances, and 
examine how private communication among competitors manifests in public disclosure 
decisions. Strategic alliances provide a direct channel for private communication between 
firms that arguably reduces any coordination benefits of public disclosure. 
Consistent with my predictions, I find that firms that enter into strategic alliances 
with competitors reduce their public disclosure about expected future business 
conditions—and specifically about forecasted demand and production levels—and that the 
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reduction is most (least) pronounced for firms in alliances that entail more (less) extensive 
private communication and less pronounced among firms in competitive industries. 
Finally, I use the staggered adoption of state tax rules that increased the benefits of forming 
strategic alliances as an exogenous shock to strategic alliance activity, and find greater 
reductions in public disclosures among affected firms.  
Thus, while much of the prior disclosure literature focuses on the monitoring and 
valuation roles of public disclosure, my collective results provide evidence of an important 
additional role of public disclosure: facilitating coordination among competitors. In this 
regard, my study represents a first step in moving beyond the standard valuation and 
monitoring paradigms that dominate much of the disclosure literature.   
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides definitions for the key variables used in my tests.  
Strategic alliance characteristics 
StrategicAlliance Natural log of 1 plus the total number of new strategic alliance 
agreements entered into by the firm during the fiscal year. 
StrategicAllianceInd Indicator that equals one if the firm entered into one or more strategic 
alliances during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  
Competitor Count of the number of strategic alliances entered into during the 
fiscal year with other firms that operate in the same Fama-French 12 
industry as the firm. 
JointVenture Indicator for whether the firm formed at least one equity-based joint 
venture during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
NParticipants Average number of participants involved in all of the new alliances 
that the firm enters into during the year. 
HighInfo Indicator that equals one if the firm entered into at least one 
manufacturing or R&D alliance during the year, and zero otherwise. 
LowInfo Indicator that equals one if the firm entered into at least one exclusive 
licensing alliance during the year, and zero otherwise. 
TerminatedAlliances Count of the number of strategic alliance terminations announced by 
the firm during the fiscal year. 
AllianceAnnouncementReturn Abnormal stock return on the strategic alliance announcement date, 
in percent. 
PublicVolume Total CRSP trading volume on the strategic alliance announcement 
date minus average daily total CRSP trading volume over my entire 
sample, scaled by the standard deviation of total CRSP insider 
volume over my entire sample. 
  
Public disclosure measures 
VolDisc Number of management forecasts issued over the 12 months 
following the fiscal year-end. 
CapExDisc Number of management capital expenditure forecasts issued over the 
12 months following the fiscal year-end. 
SalesDisc Number of management sales forecasts issued over the 12 months 
following the fiscal year-end. 
ProductionDisc Natural log of the total number of times the firm mentions 
“quantity”, “product”, “invest”, “capital expenditure”, “pricing”, 
including wildcard operators (e.g., “investment”, “production”, 
“product quantities”, etc.) in an 8-K issued over the 12 months 
following the fiscal year-end. 
MarketDemandDisc Natural log of the total number of times the firm mentions “demand”, 
“business condition”, or “market condition”, including wildcard 
operators (e.g., “market conditions”, “business demands”, etc.) in an 
8-K issued over the 12 months following the fiscal year-end. 
Controls  
Size Natural log of the book value of equity as of the end of the fiscal 
year. 
SalesVol Standard deviation of annual sales over the most recent ten fiscal 
years. 
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BTM Book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity as of the 
end of the fiscal year. 
Leverage Total liabilities scaled by total assets as of the end of the fiscal year.  
ROA Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets as of the end 
of the fiscal year. 
SpecItems Special items for the current fiscal year scaled by total assets as of 
the end of the fiscal year. 
Loss Indicator that equals one if income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise. 
Returns The firm’s buy and hold stock return over the 12 months prior to the 
fiscal year end. 
IdioVol Standard deviation of the residual from a market model of monthly 
returns estimated over the fiscal year. 
NumSegments The number of unique business segments the firm operates in during 
the fiscal year. 
R&D-to-Sales Research and development expense scaled by sales during the fiscal 
year. 
 
Competition measures 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of industry concentration, in 
percent, multiplied by (–1), calculated annually based on Fama-
French 12-industry groups. 
Log(NumFirms) Natural log of the total number of firms in the industry, calculated 
annually based on Fama-French 12-industry groups. 
MktShareTop5 Five-firm concentration ratio, measured as the market share of the 
five largest firms in the industry based on sales, multiplied by (–1), 
calculated annually based on Fama-French 12-industry groups. 
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Appendix B. Sample Descriptions of Strategic Alliances 
This appendix presents a brief sample description of several of the most common types of strategic alliances 
studied in this paper. The information for each description is taken from the news or press release used to 
identify the announcement of the strategic alliance. 
B.1. Equity joint venture 
Glanbia PLC, Dairy Farmers of America Inc (DFA), Michigan Milk Producers Association and Foremost 
Farms USA planned to form a joint venture to build and operate a new cheese and whey production facility 
in the State of Michigan, USA. Under the agreement, 50% of the joint venture will be owned by Glanbia 
and the 50% balance will be owned by DFA, MMPA and Foremost Farms. 
As part of the proposed joint venture DFA, MMPA and Foremost Farms would supply all milk required by 
the plant while Glanbia will have full responsibility for all commercial, technical and operational aspects of 
the business. If the project proceeds as planned, commissioning of the new facility is expected to take place 
in the second half of 2019. 
Commenting on the announcement, Brian Phelan, CEO of Glanbia Nutritionals said, “Glanbia is delighted 
to announce this exciting proposed project in the state of Michigan with DFA, Michigan Milk Producers 
Association and Foremost Farms. Consistent with Glanbia’s growth strategy, this proposed venture will 
build on our position as the number one producer of American-style cheddar cheese and simultaneously 
expand our global position as a supplier of advanced technology whey protein to the nutritional sector. This 
proposed joint venture is a strategic move by all the partners to benefit from the growing, large-scale milk 
pool in the State of Michigan.” 
B.2. Marketing alliance  
Kronos Advanced Technologies Inc (KA) and EOL LLC (EL) formed a 5-year strategic alliance wherein 
KA licensed EL to manufacture, wholesale and market its commercial air products, bacteriological and 
virus destruction devices and space heaters in Eastern Europe. Under terms of the agreement, EL was 
expected to give KA a fixed percentage royalty fee on every product sold, as well as upfront licensing and 
maintenance fees. Specific financial terms were not disclosed. 
B.3. Research and development alliance 
Abbott Laboratories (AL) and Neurosearch A/S (NAS) planned to form a strategic alliance (SA) to provide 
research and development services to commercialize novel compounds for the treatment of a variety of 
central and peripheral nervous system disorders.  The SA gave AL exclusive worldwide sales rights to 
compounds discovered collaboratively by AL and NAS. 
B.4. Technology alliance 
Qualcomm, Inc. granted Northern Telecom, Ltd. a license in which Northern Telecom was to evaluate 
Qualcomm’s Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology for possible use in digital mobile 
cellular and wireless in-building business telephone systems in Canada. Qualcomm disclosed it had 
recently completed a trial that verified the technical feasibility of its CDMA systems and demonstrated a 
subscriber capacity gain of greater that 10 times current analog systems under a variety of conditions, while 
providing high voice quality. 
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B.5. Manufacturing alliance 
Laguna Blends Inc and CannaCeuticals signed a letter of intent whereby Laguna and Canna plan to enter 
into a definitive Manufacturing and Exclusive Licence Agreement (the "M&L Agreement") for the purpose 
of pursuing mutually beneficial business opportunities in the Cannabidiol (CBD) skin care industry. The 
parties have agreed to an exclusivity period until July 29th in order to negotiate and sign the M&L 
Agreement. The LOI contemplates a manufacturing and licensing arrangement that includes the following 
material terms: 
Laguna will purchase the entire existing Canna inventory of 4,500 units for each of the eight existing 
Canna products for payment of: (i) US$250,000 (less an initial deposit of US$24,500 that is payable within 
7 days of entry into the M&L Agreement) on a monthly payment schedule over a six-month period; and (ii) 
a licence fee of US$100,000 payable in common shares of the Company at the prior day's closing market 
price upon entry into the M&L Agreement. - Laguna will receive an exclusive licence to sell the Canna 
products for an initial period of two years in the USA and Canada. In addition, Laguna will receive the 
licence and marketing rights to sell the Canna products in Asia, Europe and Mexico subject to Canna 
receiving regulatory approval for such sales in those markets and provided Laguna has expanded to those 
countries. The renewal term is anticipated to be determined at the end of the initial term. - Canna will 
contribute its research and development expertise in CBD-derived, high quality, Canna skin care products 
and Canna will continue to manufacture and/or arrange manufacturing for future Canna skin care inventory 
requirements for Laguna as required. - Laguna will take possession of all of the existing Canna inventory 
after the initial deposit and licence fee has been paid. 
B.6. Licensing alliance 
Amazon.com Inc and Seiki LLC planned to form a strategic alliance wherein Amazon.com Inc and Seiki 
LLC cross-licensed each other to utilize each others’ technology in United States. The strategic alliance 
will showcase Amazon Fire TV Edition which will enable native integration of the Fire TV, and will make 
it possible for viewers to watch live shows and stream movies using an Alexa-powered voice remote. 
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Appendix C. Internet Appendix for “Private Communication among Competitors 
and Public Disclosure” 
This appendix contains additional analyses referenced in my paper, and is organized as 
follows: 
 Analysis of timing of large alliance shocks (Table IA1) 
 Cross Sectional analysis of investors’ information quality (Table IA2) 
 Analysis of strategic alliances and managers’ forecast accuracy (Table IA3) 
 Analysis of strategic alliances and insider trading (Table IA4) 
 Analysis of strategic alliances and information asymmetry among investors 
(Table IA5) 
 Analysis of strategic alliance indicators and public disclosure (Table IA6) 
 Analysis of strategic alliance activity and public disclosure indicators (Table IA7) 
 Instrumental variable analysis (Table IA8) 
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Appendix C. IA Section 1: Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides definitions for the key variables used in my tests.  
Public disclosure measures 
AllianceShock Indicator that equals one if the firm is in the top quintile of new 
alliances formed in my sample (i.e., whether the firm formed five or 
more new strategic alliances for the first time), and zero otherwise\. 
 
Public disclosure measures 
ForecastAccuracy Accuracy of the latest management earnings forecast issued during the 
subsequent fiscal year, defined as the absolute value of the latest 
forecasted earnings number—or the average if the earnings forecast is 
a range—during the year less actual subsequently-announced earnings, 
scaled by market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year, multiplied 
by (–1). 
Forecaster Indicator that equals one if management issues a forecast during the 
12 months following the fiscal year end, and zero otherwise. 
InsiderBSI Insider buy-sell imbalance over the twelve months prior to the end of 
the fiscal year, calculated as the number of shares bought by insiders 
minus the number of shares sold by insiders, divided by total insider 
volume. 
InsiderNPR Insider net purchase ratio over the twelve months prior to the end of 
the fiscal year, calculated as the number of shares bought by insiders 
minus the number of shares sold by insiders, divided by the firm’s total 
trading volume. 
Spread Average daily bid-ask spread during the 25 trading days following 
fiscal year-end. 
 
Information quality measures 
NAnalyst Number of analysts with one-year ahead earnings forecasts on I/B/E/S 
as of the end of the fiscal year. 
NInstit Number of institutional owners listed on Thomson Reuters as of the 
end of the fiscal year. 
AggregateInfoQual Measure of the firm’s aggregate “peer information” quality during the 
year from Shroff, Verdi, and Yost (2017) based on the industry-wide 
(i) earnings synchronicity, (ii) total number of analysts, and (iii) 
percentage of public firms in each industry-year. 
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Appendix C. Table IA1: Timing Test: Large Strategic Alliance Shocks 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on pre- and post-strategic alliance 
formation indicators for a sample of large strategic alliance formations. AllianceShock is an indicator that 
equals one if the firm is in the top quintile of new alliances formed in my sample (i.e., whether the firm 
formed five or more new strategic alliances for the first time), and zero otherwise. All other variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. Column (1) presents results from including indicators from 4 years prior to the 
alliance shock up through 3 years after the alliance shock. Each column includes untabulated firm and year 
fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994 – 2016. 
 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct 
Variable (1) 
AllianceShockt-4 –0.010 
 (–0.03) 
AllianceShockt-3 –0.276 
 (–0.97) 
AllianceShockt-2 –0.287 
 (–0.99) 
AllianceShockt-1 –0.543** 
 (–2.01) 
AllianceShockt –0.438* 
 (–1.93) 
AllianceShockt+1 –0.519** 
 (–2.31) 
AllianceShockt+2 –0.486** 
 (–2.06) 
AllianceShockt+3 –0.426* 
 (–1.80) 
Controls Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm & Year 
F 3.92 
N 13,034 
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Appendix C. Table IA2: Cross Sectional Tests: The Coordination Benefits of 
Disclosure 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on strategic alliance activity conditional 
on investors’ information quality. All variables are as defined in Appendix and Appendix IA Section 1. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) present results using analyst following (NAnalyst), institutional investor following 
(Ninstit), and aggregate information quality (AggregateInfoQual) from Shroff et al. (2017) to measure 
InfoQual, respectively. Each model includes untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. t-statistics 
appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994 – 2016 except for Column (3) of Panel B 
which requires the necessary data from Shroff et al. (2017) to compute AggregateInfoQual. 
 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct+1 
Measure of InfoQual:  NAnalyst NInstit AggregateInfoQual 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
InfoQual×Log(NewStrategicAlliances) –0.072*** –0.004*** –1.058*** 
 (–6.61) (–8.33) (–3.21) 
InfoQual 0.327*** 0.017*** –1.312*** 
 (25.62) (19.86) (–7.60) 
Log(NewStrategicAlliances) –0.624*** –0.494*** –0.392* 
 (–7.71) (–5.73) (–1.81) 
Controls    
Size 0.450*** 0.269*** 1.040*** 
 (16.00) (8.58) (36.30) 
SalesVol 0.394*** 0.277* 0.384*** 
 (2.84) (1.91) (2.60) 
BTM –0.148*** –0.291*** –0.001 
 (–3.35) (–6.37) (–0.02) 
Leverage –0.397** –0.568*** –0.295* 
 (–2.51) (–3.46) (–1.76) 
ROA 0.839*** 1.243*** 0.671*** 
 (6.94) (10.18) (5.26) 
SpecItems –2.096*** –2.434*** –2.111*** 
 (–6.34) (–7.25) (–6.02) 
Loss 0.220*** 0.183** 0.159** 
 (3.10) (2.54) (2.12) 
Returns 0.109*** 0.043 –0.118*** 
 (3.83) (1.59) (–4.08) 
IdioVol –5.225*** –4.747*** –4.476*** 
 (–17.80) (–15.93) (–14.88) 
NumSegments 0.153*** 0.114*** 0.147*** 
 (5.35) (3.83) (4.62) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.261*** –0.226*** –0.265*** 
 (–13.00) (–11.16) (–12.58) 
Fixed Effects Industry Industry Industry 
F 219.9 191.4 170.7 
N 123,893 123,893 108,088 
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Appendix C. Table IA3: Strategic Alliances and the Managers’ Forecast Accuracy 
This table presents results from regressions of managers’ forecast accuracy (ForecastAccuracy) on strategic 
alliance activity. All variables are as defined in Appendix A and Appendix IA Section 1. Column (1) includes 
untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. Column (2) includes untabulated firm fixed effects. t-
statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994 – 2016. 
  
Dependent Variable: ForecastAccuracyt+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
Log(NewStrategicAlliances) 0.237 –0.005 
 (1.52) (–0.33) 
Controls   
Size –0.019 –0.333 
 (–0.16) (–1.49) 
SalesVol –0.448 –1.101 
 (–0.58) (–0.96) 
BTM –0.422 –0.969 
 (–1.09) (–1.39) 
Leverage –0.773 –0.494 
 (–1.03) (–1.42) 
ROA –0.354 –0.932 
 (–0.16) (–0.90) 
SpecItems –6.375* 0.810 
 (–1.80) (0.71) 
Loss –0.371 0.017 
 (–1.05) (0.32) 
Returns –0.413 –0.205 
 (–1.32) (–0.87) 
IdioVol –4.849 –1.047 
 (–1.32) (–0.64) 
NumSegments 0.058 0.077 
 (1.51) (0.60) 
R&D-to-Sales –1.407 0.381 
 (–0.89) (0.85) 
Fixed Effects Industry Firm 
F 1.197 0.858 
N 17,098 17,098 
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Appendix C. Table IA4: Strategic Alliances and Managers’ Private Information 
This table presents results from regressions of insider trading activity on the firms’ strategic alliance activity. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix A and Appendix IA Section 1. Columns (1) and (3) include 
untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include untabulated firm fixed 
effects. Columns (1) and (2) present results using the insider buy-sell imbalance over the twelve months prior 
to fiscal year-end  to measure insider trading activity (InsiderBSI). Columns (3) and (4) present results using 
insider net purchase ratio of insider buy-sell imbalance scaled by total trading volume over the twelve months 
prior to fiscal year-end as an alternative measure of insider trading activity (InsiderNPR). t-statistics appear 
in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994 – 2016. 
 
Dependent Variable: InsiderBSIt InsiderNPRt 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(NewStrategicAlliances) 0.055*** 0.022*** 0.082*** –0.011 
 (8.40) (4.05) (7.51) (–0.98) 
Controls     
Size –0.102*** –0.204*** –0.064*** –0.168*** 
 (–50.41) (–54.31) (–20.10) (–21.21) 
SalesVol –0.047*** –0.012 –0.296*** –0.294*** 
 (–3.56) (–0.55) (–9.69) (–5.64) 
BTM 0.124*** 0.075*** 0.203*** 0.182*** 
 (25.90) (13.45) (24.59) (15.77) 
Leverage 0.247*** 0.104*** 0.459*** 0.422*** 
 (18.09) (5.80) (18.17) (10.63) 
ROA –0.058*** –0.028 –0.378*** –0.246*** 
 (–3.65) (–1.49) (–11.11) (–5.61) 
SpecItems 0.128*** 0.040 0.537*** 0.302*** 
 (3.12) (0.88) (6.30) (3.11) 
Loss 0.116*** 0.077*** 0.172*** 0.145*** 
 (17.06) (11.32) (12.80) (10.20) 
Returns –0.028*** –0.003 –0.157*** –0.120*** 
 (–8.30) (–0.77) (–15.96) (–11.68) 
IdioVol 0.107*** 0.187*** –0.815*** –0.635*** 
 (3.22) (5.46) (–10.17) (–7.04) 
NumSegments 0.007*** 0.002 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (3.71) (0.68) (9.49) (5.69) 
R&D-to-Sales 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008 0.004 
 (3.44) (2.70) (1.54) (0.63) 
Fixed Effects Industry Firm Industry Firm 
F 713.4 506.7 241.8 183.1 
N 124,598 124,598 124,598 124,598 
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Appendix C. Table IA5: Strategic Alliances and Information Asymmetry 
This table presents results from regressions of information asymmetry among investors on strategic alliance 
activity. All variables are as defined in Appendix A and Appendix IA Section 1. Columns (1) includes 
untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. Column (2) includes untabulated firm fixed effects. t-
statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994 – 2016. 
 
Dependent Variable: Spreadt+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
Log(NewStrategicAlliances) 0.006*** 0.001*** 
 (21.47) (5.75) 
Controls   
Size –0.010*** –0.013*** 
 (–79.63) (–60.68) 
SalesVol 0.001** 0.003*** 
 (1.99) (3.11) 
BTM 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (6.36) (5.35) 
Leverage 0.011*** 0.001 
 (14.67) (0.91) 
ROA –0.004*** –0.003*** 
 (–3.50) (–3.26) 
SpecItems 0.005* 0.000 
 (1.93) (0.12) 
Loss –0.001*** –0.001*** 
 (–3.30) (–3.67) 
Returns –0.006*** –0.003*** 
 (–34.58) (–23.57) 
IdioVol 0.029*** 0.012*** 
 (15.22) (8.00) 
NumSegments 0.000*** –0.000 
 (4.53) (–1.30) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.001*** –0.000 
 (–9.99) (–0.35) 
Fixed Effects Industry Firm 
F 963.4 602.3 
N 123,893 123,893 
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Appendix C. Table IA6: Strategic Alliance Indicators and Voluntary Disclosure 
This table presents results from regressions of voluntary disclosure on indicators for whether the firm formed 
at least one strategic alliance during the fiscal year. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Columns (1) 
presents results using my main quantitative measure of public disclosure, VolDisc, and Columns (2) presents 
results using my main qualitative measure of public disclosure, ProductionDisc. Each column includes 
untabulated Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by 
firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Sample period is 1994 – 2016. 
 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct+1 
ProductionDisct
+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
NewStrategicAlliance –0.976*** –0.122*** 
 (–9.58) (–3.98) 
Controls   
Size 1.008*** 0.253*** 
 (36.18) (29.54) 
SalesVol 0.452*** 0.370*** 
 (3.02) (8.89) 
BTM –0.128*** 0.032* 
 (–2.65) (1.78) 
Leverage –0.255 0.380*** 
 (–1.51) (7.90) 
ROA 0.910*** –0.508*** 
 (7.08) (–9.49) 
SpecItems –2.639*** 0.026 
 (–7.57) (0.20) 
Loss 0.156** 0.369*** 
 (2.10) (16.97) 
Returns –0.175*** 0.053*** 
 (–6.25) (5.35) 
IdioVol –4.563*** 0.006 
 (–14.81) (0.06) 
NumSegments 0.112*** –0.051*** 
 (3.59) (–6.01) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.279*** –0.002 
 (–13.11) (–0.22) 
Fixed Effects Industry Industry 
F 204.6 115,230 
N 123,893 158.8 
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Appendix C. Table IA7: Strategic Alliances and Voluntary Disclosure Indicators 
This table presents results from regressions of a voluntary disclosure indicator (Forecaster) on strategic 
alliance activity during the fiscal year. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Columns (1) presents 
results using my main quantitative measure of public disclosure, VolDisc, and Columns (2) presents results 
using my main qualitative measure of public disclosure, ProductionDisc. Each column includes untabulated 
Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 
1994 – 2016. 
 
Dependent Variable: Forecastert+1 
Variable (1) 
Log(NewStrategicAlliances) –0.075*** 
 (–13.04) 
Controls  
Size 0.088*** 
 (51.54) 
SalesVol 0.060*** 
 (6.31) 
BTM 0.005 
 (1.46) 
Leverage –0.027** 
 (–2.54) 
ROA 0.091*** 
 (9.48) 
SpecItems –0.286*** 
 (–11.20) 
Loss 0.020*** 
 (4.16) 
Returns –0.030*** 
 (–14.32) 
IdioVol 0.106*** 
 (5.02) 
NumSegments 0.006*** 
 (2.91) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.024*** 
 (–17.53) 
Fixed Effects Industry 
F 19.6 
N 133,603 
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Appendix C. Table IA8: Instrumental Variables Analysis—Combined Reporting 
Rules 
This table presents results from a two-stage least squares procedure using state adoption of combined 
reporting rules as an instrument for strategic alliance activity, following Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov 
(2013) and Li, Qiu, and Wang (2018), as a shock to the benefits of forming strategic alliances. 
CombinedReportingState is an indicator equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that has adopted 
combined reporting rules, and zero otherwise, using firms’ state of headquarter data from Jennings, Lee, and 
Matsumoto (2017). All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Panel A present results from the first 
stage estimation and Panel B presents results from the second stage estimation. Each model includes 
untabulated firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample period is 
1994 – 2012. 
Panel A. Instrumental Variable: First Stage 
Dependent Variable: Log(NewStrategicAlliances) 
Variable (1) 
CombinedReportingState 0.029*** 
 (2.98) 
Controls  
Size 0.047*** 
 (14.18) 
SalesVol 0.021 
 (1.58) 
BTM 0.020*** 
 (5.75) 
Leverage 0.005 
 (0.39) 
ROA –0.071*** 
 (–4.78) 
SpecItems 0.083*** 
 (2.82) 
Loss 0.015*** 
 (3.58) 
Returns –0.013*** 
 (–5.62) 
IdioVol 0.075*** 
 (3.41) 
NumSegments –0.008*** 
 (–3.09) 
R&D-to-Sales –0.006* 
 (–1.71) 
Fixed Effects Firm & Year 
F 21.64 
N 106,517 
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Appendix C. Table IA8: Instrumental Variables Analysis—Combined Reporting 
Rules (cont’d) 
Panel B. Instrumental Variable: Second Stage 
Dependent Variable: VolDisct 
Variable (1) 
Instrumented from first stage:  
Log(NewStrategicAlliances) –11.917* 
 (–1.78) 
Controls Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm & Year 
F 34.45 
N 106,517 
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